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“The final arbiter of the quality of your work is not the client, the 
judge, or any external truth, it’s the partner you’re working for.” 1
I.  INTRODUCTION
The environments in which we practice law shape our 
understandings of what it means to be ethical and professional.2
Our practice environments, most significantly our workplaces, 
influence the roles we assume vis-à-vis our clients and the 
assumptions, values and beliefs that frame our ethical decision-
making—in other words, they shape our ethical consciousness.3
        * Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center.  I am indebted to 
many people who have assisted me in the course of this project.  First I am 
grateful to my long-time teacher, mentor, and friend, Robert Jackall at Williams 
College.  I could not have undertaken this project without his generous 
guidance, advice, and honest feedback.  I am also grateful for comments on 
earlier drafts from Jerry Kang, Thomas D. Morgan, and Bryant Garth.  I also 
want to thank my friends and colleagues Christopher Johnson and Sophie 
Sparrow for their comments, feedback, and unfailing support and my research 
assistants Julee Flood, Suzanne Ketteridge and Sarah Montgomery for their 
valuable assistance.  Finally, I want to thank the lawyers who agreed to 
participate in this project.  They have been generous with their time, open and 
thoughtful about their experiences, and committed to helping me “get it right.”  
It has been my privilege to know and work with them.  All of the opinions and 
mistakes expressed here are mine alone. 
 1. A former summer associate speaking about the experience of working 
in a large law firm.  My empirical research involved one-on-one interviews with 
twenty-two lawyers practicing in ten large firms.  Unless otherwise indicated, all 
quotes from lawyers in this article are from the interviews for this study.  
Lawyers’ names have been changed to protect their identity.  See infra Part IV 
for a full description of my methodology. 
 2. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of 
Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in 
LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 177, 179 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 
1992); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up from Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, 
Discretionary Judgment, and the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 955, 
956–57, 969 (1999); David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling 
Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND 
TROUBLE CASES 68, 71 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998). 
 3. See Rostain, supra note 2, at 969–70 (positing that professional 
environments quickly eclipse the role of law school in shaping lawyers’ beliefs 
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As a result, one lawyer can regard as unethical conduct that 
another lawyer, practicing in another setting, may see as 
uncontroversially appropriate.  Although many scholars have noted 
the significance of the link between lawyers’ workplaces and their 
ethical consciousness, empirical research exploring that 
relationship is relatively scarce.4  In this article, I report my 
preliminary findings from my ongoing empirical investigation of 
that link.  
Using large law firms as my sample, I investigate how 
bureaucratic legal workplaces “transform lawyers’ ethical sights.”5
I start with the assumption that we must learn how lawyers 
“actually experience their work”6 to understand how it influences 
and values). 
 4. See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction: New 
Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS’
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 1, 3 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (noting 
the lack of research into “[h]ow lawyers in various organizational and 
institutional locations throughout the profession see the contexts in which they 
operate, define the interests they pursue, and perceive the obligations they must 
honor.”); Rostain, supra note 2, at 963, 969–70 (arguing that “[s]ociolegal 
investigations are . . . necessary to develop a much richer account of the role of 
professional environment in shaping lawyers’ commitments and beliefs.”); Mark 
A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, Villanova University School of Law, 
School of Law Working Paper Series, Paper 13, 2004, at pp. 101–02, 114–15, 
(suggesting we must understand the social contexts in which the lawyers 
involved in recent corporate scandals worked in order to understand whether 
regulations designed to change lawyer conduct will succeed).  Robert Nelson’s 
study of lawyers working in four corporate law firms in Chicago reported in 
Partners with Power discussed in text accompanying notes 97–116, and the 
Ethics: Beyond the Rules study sponsored by the Litigation Section of the 
American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation, discussed in text 
accompanying notes 124-128, are two notable exceptions.  ROBERT L. NELSON,
PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW 
FIRM, 5–6 (1988) (exploring the influence of corporate clients on the values of 
the lawyers who represent them) [hereinafter PARTNERS WITH POWER].  
Lawrence J. Fox, Nancy McCready Higgins & Donald B. Hilliker, Report: 
Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67 FORDHAM L. REV., at 691 (1998) (investigating 
what I refer to here as the “working ethics” of large-firm lawyers) [hereinafter 
Ethics: Beyond the Rules]. 
 5. Rostain, supra note 2, at 957. 
 6. ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE 
MANAGERS 5 (1988) (describing his approach to the study of the moral ethos of 
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their ethical consciousness.  This is, therefore, an interpretive 
account of how large-firm lawyers view their work.
Through in-depth interviews with lawyers working in some of 
the country’s largest law firms,7 I identify the “set of rules, 
premiums, and sanctions that [large-firm lawyers] create and re-
create”8 to guide them as they endeavor to survive and advance in 
their firms.  I argue that when large-firm lawyers make decisions in 
which ethical concerns are implicated, they are likely to make 
those decisions according to the logic of their firms. 9  If I am 
correct, this has profound consequences for the profession.
Understanding how bureaucratic legal workplaces shape 
lawyers’ ethical consciousness is especially important now, as 
increasing numbers of American lawyers work in bureaucratic 
settings including large law firms, “business corporations, 
government agencies, mass-market legal service chains, and 
rationalized court systems.”10  Among these, I chose to study large 
law firms because they are quintessential bureaucratic legal 
workplaces.  As they have grown over the last three decades, large 
corporate managers) [hereinafter JACKALL].  In Moral Mazes, Jackall gives a 
rich and nuanced account of the experience of managers working in large 
corporate bureaucracies, and the influence of that experience on their moral 
consciousness.  An early report of Jackall’s study was first published in the 
Harvard Business Review. Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: Bureaucracy and 
Managerial Work, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1983, at 118. 
 7. See infra Part IV for a description of the lawyers I interviewed. 
 8. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 112. 
 9. Id. I use the phrase “logic of their firms” to refer to what Jackall 
labeled “institutional logic,” which he defined as: 
the [c]omplicated, experientially constructed, and, therefore 
contingent, set of rules, premiums, and sanctions that men and 
women in a particular context create and re-create in such a 
way that their behavior and accompanying perspectives are to 
some extent regularized and predictable . . . .  [A]lthough 
individuals are participants in shaping the logic of institutions, 
they often experience that logic as an objective set of norms.  
And, of course, [managers’] own fates depend on how well 
they accomplish defined goals in accordance with the 
organizational logic of their situation.  
Id.
10. Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal 
Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 857 (1998). 
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firms have become increasingly bureaucratic in structure,11
mirroring their corporate clients.  Unlike corporations and many 
government agencies that are organized by non-lawyers for other 
purposes, however, large law firm bureaucracies are organized by 
lawyers for the sole purpose of providing legal services.  
Sociologists have long theorized that bureaucracies shape the 
thinking of the individuals who work within them in distinctive 
ways.12  Empirical studies have tested and refined this theory.13
One of the most widely respected of these studies, Robert Jackall’s 
Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate Managers,14 has served as a 
11. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 857–58 (noting that lawyers working 
in large law firms are “experiencing a significant bureaucratization of their 
professional workplaces” and “experiencing an unprecedented degree of both 
commodification and supervisory control.”); see also PARTNERS WITHOUT 
POWER, supra note 4 (describing the transformation in both size and complexity 
of the large law firm).  
12. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN 
MIDDLE CLASS (Oxford Univ. Press, 1951); WILLIAM A. WHYTE, THE 
ORGANIZATION MAN (Simon and Schuster, 1956). 
13. See, e.g., JACKALL, supra note 6, at 11, and sources cited therein at 
235–38 summarizing theoretical and empirical works on bureaucracy.
14. Jackall’s Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate Managers has 
achieved wide acceptance.  It is well regarded in sociological circles and is used 
in the curriculum of many business schools.  See, e.g., Syllabi in business school 
courses: Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, Management 422 Term 
2, 2004, Power and Politics, available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/larrick/ 
management 422/files/PP%20syllabus202004.pdf; Wharton School of Business, 
LGST 210 Corporate Responsibility and Ethics Honors Version, available at 
http://download.wharton.upenn.edu/download/pub/lgst/syllabi/spring2004/lgst 
210.301.pdf; MIT, Fall 2001, Professor R. Gibbons, available at http://www. 
people.hbs.edu/rgibbons/945_Syl_9+14.pdf-supplemental result, and Syllabi in 
sociology courses: Sociology of Complex Organizations, Sociology 412, Fall 
2001 Minnesota State University, Professor Olday available at http://www. 
mnstate.edu/scj/olday/Soc 412/Syllabus.Htm-30k and Sociology V3100, 
Introduction to Social Theory, Professor Polletta available at 
http://www.sociology. 
columbia.edu/undergraduate/academics/courses/v3100.pdf. It has been cited by 
legal scholars numerous times as evidence of what is happening in large 
corporate bureaucracies.  E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational 
Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons 
of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968 (2002); Lawrence E. Mitchell and 
Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a 
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model for my study of lawyers working in large law firms.15
Jackall concludes that work in American corporate bureaucracies 
shapes corporate managers’ habits of mind in characteristic ways 
and that those habits of mind, in turn, shape managers’ moral 
consciousness.16
Similarly, based on the first phase of my research, I conclude 
that work in large law firm bureaucracies shapes lawyers’ habits of 
mind in distinct ways.  Large-firm lawyers work in a world where 
the relevant norms change frequently. Implicit in the opening 
quote, “The final arbiter of the quality of your work is not the 
client, the judge, or any external truth, it’s the partner you’re 
working for,” 17 is the interviewee’s understanding that lawyers 
working in large firms must respond to varying sets of norms in the 
course of their work.  What constitutes high quality work varies 
depending on the lawyer’s supervisor.  The proper writing style for 
one partner may be spare and legalistic while another prefers more 
literary prose.  One partner may prefer to maintain friendly and 
accommodating relations with opposing counsel, while another 
adopts reserved and suspicious stances.  One partner may want 
responsive documents produced upon request unless strong 
arguments exist for withholding them, while another may want 
documents withheld on any arguably non-frivolous ground unless 
the other side moves to compel their disclosure.  
Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (2002). 
 15. Numerous legal scholars have suggested that research, akin to 
Jackall’s research with large corporations, be done in law firms. See, e.g., Robert 
Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars and the “Middle Ground,” 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075, 
2088, n.41 (1993); Robert Granfield and Thomas Koenig, “It’s Hard to be a 
Human Being and a Lawyer”: Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with 
Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 495 (2003); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853 (1995); 
Sargent, supra note 4, at 112. 
16. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 119 & 191–204.  I use the term “habit of 
mind” here in the sense that Jackall uses the term in Moral Mazes, JACKALL,
supra note 6, at 119.  The term refers to the patterns of thinking that individuals 
develop in response to their experiences in, and the incentives created by, the 
social structures in which they work. 
 17. A former summer associate was speaking about the experience of 
work in a large law firm.  See supra note 1. 
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The degree of variation in the norms at play in large law firm 
bureaucracies makes the experience of work in large firms 
fundamentally different from that in small firms and plays a crucial 
role in shaping large-firm lawyers’ unique habit of mind.
Although lawyers working in small firms often begin their careers 
working for other lawyers, and, therefore, must also respond to 
varying norms, they typically begin working autonomously 
(without supervision) earlier in their careers than do large-firm 
lawyers.  As a result, small firm lawyers begin selecting their own 
norms relatively early in their careers.18 In contrast, many large-
firm lawyers work for other lawyers, and thus must respond to the 
varying norms of their supervisors, for much of their careers.  
Further, as large firms have grown larger and more culturally and 
geographically diverse and as lawyers move from one firm to 
another, the norms espoused by the powerful lawyers within these 
firms have become more varied.  
In addition to pleasing the various lawyers who provide them 
with work, large-firm lawyers (in contrast to small-firm lawyers) 
must also meet the expectations of a growing group of lawyer-
managers in their firms’ management hierarchies.  The norms 
espoused by the lawyer-managers who run large firms tend to
change with some frequency.  For example, firm management may 
espouse as a norm the ideal that litigators should see themselves as 
rainmakers.  After hiring a consultant, however, firm management 
may change the prevailing norms to reflect a new strategic plan 
that envisions litigators as service providers to other practice 
groups in the firm. 
Because norms vary among the powerful partners within a 
firm and over time, lawyers working in today’s large law firms 
employ a characteristic “choice of norm” rule to guide them.19
Like a choice of law rule that says the law of the state where an 
18. Certainly, small firm lawyers may look to others for guidance about 
what norms to adopt, but I am suggesting they have an opportunity early in their 
careers to make choices about the content of the norms they adopt.  For a report 
of a wonderful preliminary empirical study of small and solo firm practitioners, 
see Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 309 (2004). 
19. See infra Part VI for a definition of choice of norm rule. 
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auto accident occurs is the source of governing law in a tort claim 
arising out of the accident, large-firm lawyers’ choice of norm rule 
identifies the source of norms a lawyer should follow in a 
particular situation if he wants to act in accord with the logic of his 
firm.
Large-firm lawyers’ choice of norm rule reflects the varying 
norms at play in large firms: the appropriate norms to apply in a 
given situation are those of the people the lawyer is working for 
and with at the time. 20  Because this choice of norm rule makes the 
partner or coterie a lawyer is working for at the time the source of 
norms, the lawyer asks, “What norms would the partner or coterie I 
am working with follow in this situation?” 
The choice of norm rule large-firm lawyers employ is a 
critical component of the distinctive, “social, cognitive, and 
evaluative frameworks”21 large-firm lawyers develop to negotiate 
their careers in large firms.  As a consequence, across large firms, 
lawyers approach their work in characteristic ways.  Further, I 
argue here that large-firm lawyers are likely to approach the moral 
and ethical dimensions of their work in these same, characteristic 
ways—employing the same social, cognitive and evaluative 
frameworks, including the choice of norm rule, they follow in 
other aspects of their work.  I am not suggesting that large-firm
lawyers’ ethical norms are identical across firms or even within 
firms.  Rather, I argue that the choice of norm rule that shapes 
large-firm lawyers’ approach to moral and ethical issues is likely to 
be the same across firms.
Because the choice of norm rule in use in large-firm
bureaucracies makes the norms lawyers follow highly mutable, 
large-firm lawyers place great importance on their own ability to 
discern the norms appropriate to the situation. As a result, their 
20. Law schools arguably prepare law students to adopt the choice of 
norm rules I identify here.  Most of us who teach have heard law students talk 
about tailoring exam answers to what particular professors want.  In Making 
Elite Lawyers, Robert Granfield notes that law school pedagogy forces students 
to “reconceptualize their consciousness in ways that are compatible with the 
professional culture.”  ROBERT GRANDFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS VISIONS 
OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc. 1992). 
 21. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 11. 
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habit of mind22 is to focus on which norms to follow when, rather 
than on the content of the norms themselves.  In other words, the 
large-firm lawyers’ habit of mind is to discern the norm 
“appropriate” to the situation, not to judge the merits of any given 
norm.  If large-firm lawyers carry this habit of mind into their 
approach to ethical and moral issues, it will shape their ethical 
consciousness in very distinct ways:  A habit of mind that focuses 
on identifying what norms others would follow rather than on the 
content of the norms themselves will “convert principles into 
guidelines, ethics into etiquette, [and] values into tastes.”23  Indeed, 
in a world where what norms one follows depends on what norms 
one’s superiors would follow, principles can only be guidelines, 
ethics can only be etiquette, and values can only be tastes.  
If other choice of norm rules prevailed in large firms, the 
proper source of norms with respect to ethical and moral issues 
might be the applicable code of professional responsibility or a 
lawyer’s own sense of morality and propriety.  A lawyer working 
in a world where the choice of norm rule directs him to consult 
fixed or internal sources of norms is likely to understand ethics and 
morals as rooted in principles or values.  In contrast, the choice of 
norm rule and associated habit of mind I found at work in large 
law firms encourages a consciousness that understands ethics, 
morals, principles and values as mutable—i.e. as guidelines, 
etiquette and tastes. 
The choice of norm rule I identify at work in large law firms is 
similar to the evaluative rules that Jackall found managers employ 
in large corporate bureaucracies.  I argue that the choice of norm 
rule large-firm lawyers follow is a function of the peculiar 
bureaucratic structure of large law firms described below. If I am 
correct, the increasing bureaucratization of lawyers’ workplaces 
has significant implications for debates about ethics and 
professionalism.24
22. Id. at 119. 
 23. Id. at 204. 
 24. I suspect the habits of mind lawyers develop in large government and 
nonprofit bureaucracies will be somewhat different than those of lawyers 
working in large law firms.  A full understanding of the role of bureaucracy in 
shaping nonprofit and government lawyers’ ethical consciousness will require 
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I introduce my argument here as two equations:  first, 
bureaucracy generates a characteristic choice of norm rule; second, 
this choice of norm rule encourages a morality characterized by 
organizational pragmatism rather than principled decision-making.  
I begin this way in an attempt to distill the relationship between 
large-firm bureaucracies and ethics.  However, in my quest for 
clarity, I have greatly oversimplified the workings of large law 
firms as social institutions.  In describing my empirical findings in 
Sections IV through VII below, I hope to more accurately reflect 
the complex, fluid, and richly nuanced workings of the human 
institutions that are large law firm bureaucracies.
I begin in Section II with a description of Robert Jackall’s 
study of managers in large corporations and the role of 
bureaucracy in shaping managers’ moral consciousness.  In 
Section III, I review the recent legal scholarship on large law 
firms.  Section IV outlines my methodology.  In Section V, I 
describe the characteristic social structures of large law firms.  
Section VI describes the conflicts, tensions, incentives, and 
motivations created as the marketplace exerts pressure on these 
bureaucracies.  Against the backdrop of the structure of large-firm 
bureaucracies, and the conflicts and tensions created as these 
bureaucracies compete in the marketplace, I examine in Section 
VII the experience of individual lawyers working in these firms.  
Through the voices of the large-firm lawyers I interviewed, I 
describe the organizational logic that guides them as they navigate 
their way through the complex social terrain of their bureaucracies.  
Finally, in Section VIII, comparing my observations with those of 
other scholars, I link, in very particular ways, the organizational 
logic at work in large firms with the ethical consciousness of the 
lawyers working in them. 
II.  THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN SHAPING CORPORATE 
MANAGERS’ ETHICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
In Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate Managers, Robert 
Jackall explores how bureaucracy shapes corporate managers’ 
empirical study of the peculiar form of bureaucracy developed in those 
organizations. 
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moral consciousness.25  He finds that the rules corporate managers 
develop and follow in their quest “for survival and success are at 
the heart of what might be called the bureaucratic ethic, a moral 
code that guides managers through all the dilemmas and 
vicissitudes that confront them in the big organization.”26  Jackall 
reports on managers in three companies: a chemical company and 
its parent conglomerate, a large textile company, and a large public 
relations firm.27  Jackall conducted more than 140 interviews of 
managers working in these corporations.28  Through these 
interviews he identifies:
[t]he actual evaluative rules that managers fashion 
and follow in their work world, the rules that govern 
their stances toward and interaction with their 
superiors, subordinates, and peers; their friends 
allies and rivals; their business customers and 
competitors; regulators and legislators; the media; 
and the specific publics they address and the public 
at large.29
The “evaluative rules” Jackall describes are among the 
“experientially constructed . . . set of rules, premiums, and 
sanctions”30 managers create and recreate to guide them through 
their work lives.  He notes that, while managers play a role in 
“shaping [these rules, premiums, and sanctions], they often 
experience [them] as an objective set of norms.”31
Among the complex set of “evaluative rules” Jackall identifies 
are what I have labeled “choice of norm” rules.  Jackall examines 
“the particular conceptions of right and wrong, of proper and 
improper, that underpin those rules”32 and asks “how the social and 
25. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 205. 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. Id. at 15. 
 28. Id. at 205. 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 112 (referring to these rules, premiums and sanctions 
collectively as the “institutional logic” of large corporate bureaucracies). 
 31. Id. at 112. 
 32. Id. at 4. 
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bureaucratic context of [managers’] work—the warp across which 
the threads of their careers are stretched—shape their occupational 
moralities.”33  He concludes that bureaucratic work encourages a 
distinct set of evaluative rules.34  These rules and the habits of mind 
managers develop as they try to understand and follow them shape 
corporate managers’ moral consciousness in characteristic ways.35
By examining the evaluative rules managers follow and the habits 
of mind they develop, Jackall provides a rich and highly nuanced 
account of the role of bureaucracy in shaping corporate managers’ 
moral consciousness.
Jackall begins Moral Mazes, The World of Corporate 
Managers with a description of the unique characteristics of 
American corporate bureaucracies.36  He describes them as 
“hybrids,”37 part Max Weber’s “pure form” bureaucracy and part 
“patrimonial bureaucracy.”38  Bureaucracy in its pure form as 
envisioned by Weber is:
characterized by a kind of legalistic objectivity, by 
close attention to details and to orders, by adherence 
to standardized procedures, by thorough written 
documentation of daily business in well-maintained 
files, by impartial and fair treatment under law, by a 
consequent impersonality, and by a separation of 
offices from persons.39
Although American corporate bureaucracy has incorporated 
many of the “structural features of [the] pure form [of] 
bureaucracy,” Jackall finds it also has “many of the features of 
personal loyalty, favoritism, informality and nonlegality that 
marked crucial aspects of the American historical experience.”40
Thus, power in American corporate bureaucracies is personal and, 
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 5–6. 
 35. Id. at 204. 
 36. Id. at 11–12. 
 37. Id. at 11. 
 38. Id.  
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
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as a result, managers’ personal relationships with their superiors 
are of preeminent importance.41
Once they reach a certain level in the corporate hierarchy, 
Jackall found that managers do not believe their further 
advancement will depend on their performance.42  Instead, 
“managers see success depending principally on meeting social 
criteria established by the authority and political alignments—that 
is, by the fealty and alliance structure—and by the ethos and style 
of the corporation.”43  In order to understand those social criteria 
and make decisions, managers develop the habit of mind of 
“looking up and looking around.”44  They look up to those above 
them on the corporate ladder and around to those in their various 
social networks to understand the rules-in-use that guide behavior 
and decision-making among their superiors and peers.45  They look 
up and around to ascertain what “public face”46 to present.47  Thus, 
managers must “master[] the social rules that prescribe which 
41. Id. at 35–40. 
 42. Id. at 45. 
 43. Id. Jackall introduces his study with a question:  
What if men and women in the big corporation no longer see 
success as necessarily connected to hard work?  What 
becomes of the social morality of the corporation—the 
everyday rules in use that people play by—when there is 
thought to be no fixed or, one might say, objective standard of 
excellence to explain how and why winners are separated from 
also-rans, how and why some people succeed and others fail?  
What rules do people fashion to interact with one another 
when they feel that, instead of ability, talent, and dedicated 
service to an organization, politics, adroit talk, luck, 
connections and self-promotion are the real sorters of people 
into sheep and goats?  
Id. at 3.  My research indicates the lack of fixed standards and the role of 
“politics adroit talk, luck, connections and self-promotion” in sorting the 
winners and losers in the quest for advancement has resonance for many large-
firm lawyers working their way up the partnership ladder. 
 44. Id. at 77. 
 45. Id. at 37–40, 59–62. 
 46. “External appearances, modes of self presentation, interactional 
behavior, and projection of general attitude together constitute [a manager’s] 
public face.” Id. at 46. 
 47. Id. at 37–40, 59–62. 
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mask [public face] to wear on which occasion.”48  The public face 
appropriate in one situation (e.g., in a meeting with one’s boss and 
his/her allies) may not be appropriate in another (e.g., a meeting 
with managers outside this coterie).
The skill of looking up and around is challenged by the 
contingent nature of power in large corporations.49 Frequent 
reorganizations and shake-ups mean that power is constantly being 
redistributed in corporate bureaucracies.50  New CEOs are anointed 
and they reorganize to show the financial markets they are 
aggressively making changes.51  New divisions are bought, existing 
divisions are reorganized and numerous managers are fired.52
One’s boss is assigned a new position.  As power changes hands,
or as those at the top find it expedient to change the norms in use, 
managers must recognize when and how the norms, including 
norms of public face, have changed.53
Successful managers understand the choice of norm rules—
they know whose norms are appropriate to the situation.54  They are 
also adept at noting a change in the prevailing norms.55
Accordingly, successful managers develop certain characteristic 
habits of mind:  They look up and around, they are flexible and 
able to adapt their styles as needed, and they pay close attention to 
perceptions.56  They understand how they need to be perceived and 
are able to accurately assess how others see them.57
Those who make their way to the highest rungs of the 
corporate ladder shape the norms that filter down through their 
organizations.58  For instance, Jackall reports that when 
“reorganizations in the chemical company brought new circles of 
48. Id. at 46. 
 49. Id. at 59–61. 
 50. Id. at 24–25, 33, 67, 73, 134–35. 
 51. Id. at 25. 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 25–33. 
 53. Id. at 21–23, 59–61. 
 54. Id. at 59–61.  
 55. Id. 
56. Id. at 59, 75–100. 
 57. Id. at 59, 64, 203–04.  Jackall concludes that this necessitates a 
particular form of narcissism.  Id. at 61. 
 58. Id. at 36. 
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managers to power . . . . [t]he notion of ‘lean, hungry, and 
aggressive management’ became the watchword and the bonhomie 
of the old regime became dangerous.”59  Thus, the style norms in 
the corporation change to reflect the styles and philosophies of 
those in power.60  Some of the norms that come from the top may 
have moral or ethical dimensions.61  For instance, a new CEO may 
“espouse policies of product responsibility, tying organizational 
rewards to sustained vigilance over the uses and possible uses to 
which a product might be put.  Such programs thus try to link 
individual success, reduction of corporate liability, and consumer 
safety.”62  But the norms that come from the top of the corporate 
hierarchy are subject to the choice of norm rules managers 
follow.63  Jackall’s work suggests that it is these evaluative rules—
the rules I have labeled “choice of norm rules,” not the norms 
themselves, that play the crucial role in shaping managers’ moral 
consciousness.64  The choice of norm rule reflects the lack of fixed 
norms.
65
  It places a premium on the ability to read the prevailing 
norms and apply the norms appropriate to the situation.66  Thus, in 
corporate bureaucracies “morality does not emerge from some set 
of internally held convictions or principles”67 or even from the 
norms being generated and disseminated from the top.68  The 
appropriate norms to apply in a given situation, whether they are 
style norms or moral norms, are those of “some person, some 
coterie, some social network, some clique that matters”69 to the 
manager at that time, in that particular situation.  
59. Id. at 61. 
 60. Id. at 58–61. 
 61. Id. at 198–201. 
 62. Id. at 199.  Perhaps these policies are the genesis of the proliferation 
of warning labels on products that warn against seemingly farfetched potential 
uses.  Id.  
63. Id. at 192. 
 64. Id. at 191–204. 
 65. Id. at 191–94.  
 66. Id. at 192–94.  
 67. Id. at 101. 
 68. Id. at 192–94.  
 69. Id. at 101. 
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Jackall describes the fate of a manager in one of the 
corporations he studied who failed to understand or to follow the 
choice of norm rules and the reactions of other managers to his 
plight.70  Brady, an accountant, discovered various financial and 
accounting irregularities in his company, including bribes paid to 
foreign officials, doctored invoices, and manipulation of the 
company’s pension fund.71  He attempted to report his discoveries 
up the ladder and to the company’s general counsel over a period 
of months.72  When Brady refused to ignore the problems after 
being asked to do so by a colleague sent to “cool things down,” he 
was fired.73  Brady saw his predicament as a moral one.74  He told 
Jackall: 
So what I’m saying is that at bottom, I was in 
jeopardy of violating my professional code.  And I 
feel you have to stick up for that . . . .  I am 
frightened of losing respect, my self-respect in 
particular.  And since that was tied with my respect 
for my profession, the two things were joined 
together.75
Other managers Jackall interviewed saw Brady’s situation as 
“devoid of moral and ethical content.”76  In their view: 
[H]e violated the fundamental rules of bureaucratic 
life . . . . (1) You never go around your boss.  (2) 
You tell your boss what he wants to hear, even 
when your boss claims that he wants dissenting 
views.  (3) If your boss wants something dropped, 
you drop it.  (4) You are sensitive to your boss’s 
wishes so that you anticipate what he wants; you 
don’t force him, in other words, to act as boss.  (5) 
70. Id. at 105–11.  
 71. Id. at 105–07. 
 72. Id. at 106–08.  
 73. Id. at 108–09. 
 74. Id. at 109. 
 75. Id.  
76. Id.  
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Your job is not to report something your boss does 
not want reported but rather to cover it up.77
Brady refused to follow what I have labeled the choice of 
norm rule of the corporation, which required him to look up and 
around to understand what his boss would deem proper conduct 
and to follow his boss’s norms.  Instead, he looked to his 
professional code as the source of norms.  Jackall says: 
Brady refused to recognize, in the view of the 
managers I interviewed, that ‘truth’ is socially 
defined, not absolute, and that therefore 
compromise, about anything and everything, is not 
moral defeat, as Brady seems to feel, but an 
inevitable fact of organizational life.  They see this 
as the key reason why Brady’s bosses did him in.  
And they too would do him in without any qualms.78
Jackall concludes that the ethos managers in large 
corporations:
[T]urn principles into guidelines, ethics into 
etiquette, values into tastes, personal responsibility 
into an adroitness at public relations and notions of 
truth into credibility.  Corporate managers who 
become imbued with this ethos pragmatically take 
their world as they find it and try to make that world 
work according to its own institutional logic.79
Since an increasing numbers of lawyers work in bureaucratic 
settings, we must understand whether the growing number of legal 
bureaucracies shape lawyers’ moral consciousnesses in similar 
ways.  Because lawyers and the work they do differ from corporate 
managers and their work in important ways, we cannot assume 
large law firm bureaucracies have the same effects.  Most notably, 
77. Id. at 109–10. 
 78. Id. at 111. 
 79. Id. at 204. 
4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM
648 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 4
lawyers are required to comply with a code of ethics.80  Further, 
even large corporate law firms—the legal bureaucracies that have 
the most in common with, and work for, large corporations—differ 
from corporate bureaucracies in other significant ways.  The CEO 
of a corporation serves at the will of the board of directors and 
shareholders.  In contrast, although large law firms are now usually 
managed by one or a small group of powerful partners, those 
managers serve at the pleasure of those they manage—the other 
equity partners in the firm.  In my study, I set out to learn how the 
peculiar form of today’s large law firm bureaucracies shape the 
moral consciousness of the lawyers who work in them.  
III.  THE STUDY OF LARGE LAW FIRMS
I do not begin my study of today’s large corporate law firms 
on a blank slate.  As they have grown larger and more 
bureaucratic, these firms have become a particular focus of study.81
Legal scholars have addressed a number of important theoretical 
and empirical questions that have deepened our understanding of 
these workplaces.  As yet, however, no one has systematically 
investigated how the bureaucratic structure of these firms shapes 
lawyers’ ethical consciousness.
Much of the recent scholarship on large law firms is 
theoretical and views large firms through the lens of law and 
economics analysis.82  In their seminal study of large firms, Why 
80. Many scholars have noted the weak enforcement of professional 
codes. See, e.g., Mona L. Hymel, Symposium Introduction: The Future Structure 
and Regulation of Law Practice: Controlling Behavior:  the Sources and Uses of 
Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 878–82, 890 
(2002) and sources cited therein.  When lawyers’ professional codes are 
enforced, scholars and the popular legal press have documented that solo 
practitioners and small firms “are disciplined at a far greater rate than other 
lawyers.” Id. See also Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Small and Solo Law 
Firm Practitioners, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 309, 312 (2004). 
 81. In contrast to small firms, large firms have been the focus of more 
than their share of scholarly attention.  See Leslie C. Levin, Symposium: 
Preliminary Reflections on the Professional Development of Solo and Small 
Firm Practitioners, 70 FORD. L. REV. 847, 848 (2001) and sources cited therein. 
 82. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Firms 
get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and the Growth of Large 
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the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and 
the Growth of Large Law Firms, Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay 
used law and economic theory to explain the growth and structure 
of large law firms.83  Galanter and Palay argue that the exponential 
growth of large law firms over the last century was driven by their 
structure, which the authors describe as a “promotion-to-partner 
tournament.”84  According to Galanter and Palay, large-firm
partners use associates to maximize partners’ surplus human 
capital—their ability to generate more legal work from their 
relationships with lucrative clients than they can do themselves.85
To maintain the value of their human capital, partners must ensure 
that associates produce a high volume of quality work.86
Galanter and Palay posit that firms use a promotion-to-partner 
tournament as a monitoring mechanism to encourage associates to 
work hard and provide high quality legal services to their clients.87
Partners lose money if they have to spend significant time closely 
supervising associates’ work beyond an initial period.88  By 
deferring some of the associates’ income until partnership and 
challenging them to compete for a limited number of partnership 
seats, large firms create incentives for associates to produce a large 
volume of quality work with little supervision.89  Galanter and 
Palay argue that the promotion-to-partner tournament necessitates 
that large firms grow exponentially, because as the number of 
partners grows, the firm must increase the number of associates to 
replace those who are promoted to provide the new partners with 
associates to do their work.90
Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747 (1990); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, 
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding and Information 
Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 
(1998). 
 83. See Galanter & Palay, supra note 82.  
 84. Id. at 766. 
 85. Id. at 770–73. 
 86. Id. at 773–76. 
 87. Id. at 780–83; Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1584. 
 88. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 779–82. 
 89. Id. at 780–83. 
 90. Id. at 783–89. 
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David Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati reconceived Galanter and 
Palay’s tournament theory to account for a number of anecdotal 
and preliminary empirical findings that appeared inconsistent with 
classic tournament theory.91  In the course of their studies on the 
role of race in large law firms,92 Wilkins and Gulati find that not all 
associates participate in the tournament, and that the selection of 
partners is not based on past performance as a “rank order” 
tournament would suggest, but on forward-looking criteria.93  They 
also find that the partnership tournament is not played on a level 
playing field; associates are tracked and seeded94 from the outset 
for the coveted training assignments that ensure a group of 
associates are trained for partner-like work.95  Also, the partners 
who declare the winners and losers of the promotion are not 
neutral, i.e., they have a stake in who wins.96  Further, Wilkins and 
Gulati argue that Galanter and Palay’s theory does not recognize 
the pivotal role human and relational capital play in determining 
who wins and who loses the tournament.97
A number of other scholars following in this vein employ law 
and economics theory to analyze other aspects of large law firms, 
91. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82.  I say “appeared inconsistent” here 
because in A Little Jousting about the Tournament, Galanter and Palay argue 
that some of these findings were new and that others were not inconsistent.  
Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, A Little Jousting About the Tournament, 84 
VA. L. REV. 1683 (1998). 
 92. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1586. 
 93. Id. at 1586–87, 1606, 1620–24. 
94. Firms track associates as they move through the multi-round 
tournaments from junior to senior associates competing for choice training 
assignments and the “associates” who do well in early rounds are favored and 
protected in later rounds.  Id. at 1643–58.  Associates are seeded (selected at the 
outset for choice training assignments) on the basis of pedigree (“signaling”), 
i.e., law school, class rank, law review membership and judicial clerkship.  Id. at 
1651–58. 
 95. Id. at 1641–44. 
 96. Id. at 1615–19. 
 97. Id. at 1657–60, 1669–70.  Human capital refers to a lawyer’s ability 
to generate more work than she can do herself as a result of her native 
intelligence, her legal education and skills, her professional reputation and her 
relationships with clients.  Galanter & Palay, supra note 83, at 768.
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including the role of race in large firms.98  As Wilkins and Gulati 
note, “[t]here are, however, limitations on the usefulness and 
reliability of these [law and economic based] accounts.  For the 
most part, this work is theoretical, rather than empirical, often 
relying on anecdotal evidence from the legal press.”99
In contrast, Robert Nelson in Partners with Power, employed 
the empirical tools of sociology to investigate the structure of large 
law firms.100  More than fifteen years since its publication, Partners 
with Power still represents the most thorough and systematic 
empirical study of large law firms to date.  From 1979-1981, 
Nelson studied four large Chicago law firms; two that were 
traditional in their structure and two that were bureaucratic.101  In 
labeling firms as traditional or bureaucratic, Nelson looks at three 
criteria: (1) policy making and strategic planning, (2) 
administration and monitoring of data, and (3) the organization and 
stability of work groups.102  Policy making in traditional firms is 
“ad hoc and reactive”103 while in bureaucratic firms a “specialized 
policy making group . . . actively engages in strategic planning.”104
Traditional firms do not have full-time managers and do not 
engage in systematic “monitoring of internal performance 
measures or financial information,”105 while bureaucratic firms do. 
And finally, in contrast to traditional firms, bureaucratic firms have 
“well-defined work groups” with leaders who report up a 
management ladder.106
98. See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in 
Corporate Law Firms, An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 515 
(1996) (combining rational choice theory with a recognition of the role played 
by “professional ideology, social capital and inequality”). 
 99. Id. at 543 (placing their work in this theoretical/anecdotal tradition 
while acknowledging the limits of this form of argument and describing the 
preliminary empirical research they used to supplement the publicly available 
information). 
 100. See PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4. 
 101. Id. at 92.  
 102. Id. 
103. Id. at 91.   
 104. Id.  
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
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Nelson asked why the bureaucratic firms had adopted 
bureaucratic structures and how they differed from the traditional 
firms.107  He concluded that the bureaucratization of large firms “as 
a means of improving service to clients and increasing partnership 
profits appears to be in the economic self-interest of the client-
responsible elite.”108  He found that the bureaucratic firms, like the 
traditional firms, were dominated by a small group of partners who 
had relationships with the firm’s most important clients.109  Thus 
the firms’ adoption of a bureaucratic structure had not changed the 
essential nature of power in those firms.110  Further, Nelson found 
that 
although work and careers have changed 
significantly as firms grow and become 
differentiated, the model of professionalism 
continues to be the independent practitioner . . . . 
Individual lawyers choose their roles (the field they 
work in, the partners they work for, the hours they 
work) and are ultimately responsible for their 
personal success or failure in the organization.111
Nelson went on to posit a theory of social change to explain 
how these firms reconciled their bureaucratic structure with 
traditional notions of professionalism.112  He argued that 
professional “values relating to organizational policies arise inside 
the firm and reflect the managerial ideology of the elite in 
power.”113  While bureaucratic structures clashed with much of the 
107. Id. at 17, 25–29. 
 108. Id. at 225. 
 109. Id. at 224–28, 288–89. 
 110. Id.   
111. Id. at 278. This notion of professionalism is akin to historic notions 
about the role of merit in determining who succeeds in large corporations.  
JACKALL, supra, note 6, at 3, 7–16.  My findings suggest that, like managers in 
corporate America, many lawyers working in large-firm bureaucracies no longer 
believe that responsibility for their success or failure within their firms is 
ultimately within their control. 
 112. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 23–24. 
 113. Id. at 220. 
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traditional rhetoric of professionalism, those firms that successfully 
adopted bureaucratic structures reinvented professional ideology to 
rationalize the structures they imposed.114  An example illustrates 
his point.  The notion that a lawyer was free to choose the field(s) 
he worked in and to move from field to field as he desired was 
central to traditional notions of professionalism.115  In one of the 
bureaucratic Chicago firms Nelson studied, incoming associates 
were required to join a specific department at the outset rather than 
explore a variety of practice areas.116  The ideology of the firm 
espoused by its dominant partners was that professionalism 
connotes a high degree of competence and competence requires 
specialization.117  Lawyers cannot produce the high quality 
professional work their clients demand unless they specialize.118
Accordingly, Nelson concluded that “[p]rofessionalism did not 
determine the organizational practice, but was constructed within 
each firm according to its particular history and the interests of its 
most powerful partners.”119
Building on Nelson’s earlier work in Lawyers’ 
Ideals/Lawyers’ Practices, Nelson and David Trubek suggested an 
interpretive framework for the study of the areas of the legal 
profession “that integrates studies of structural and organizational 
changes with studies of the reactions and perceptions of the actors 
involved in the changing systems.”120  They argued that:
[P]rofessional ideals [are] formed partly within the 
workplace and partly as designed consciously or 
unconsciously, by lawyers for the promotion of 
their economic, power and status goals.  Thus 
“ideals” carry within themselves heavy traces of 
what we have called “structure.” But they also can 
114. Id. at 205–07 (summarizing Nelson’s findings in PARTNERS WITH 
POWER). 




119. Nelson & Trubek, supra note 2, at 207 (summarizing Nelson’s 
findings in PARTNERS WITH POWER). 
 120. Id. at 22. 
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be seen as a set of dispositions that have a logic 
partially independent of the structures that produce 
them. They may, therefore, become the object of 
competition among individual or collective actors 
who seek to appropriate (or perhaps accommodate) 
elements of a professional tradition in order to 
advance a particular mode of professional 
organization or pursue other objectives.121
Many of the scholarly works discussed above express concern 
about how the structural changes large law firms have undertaken, 
and the changes in the markets they serve, affect the ethics of 
large-firm lawyers.122  The organized bar and the popular legal 
press have expressed similar concerns.123  In response to some of 
these concerns, a number of prominent legal and social science 
scholars working in this area participated in Ethics: Beyond the 
Rules, a project sponsored by the Litigation Section of the 
American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation, 
designed to study large-firm lawyers’ ethics.124  In 1998, the 
study’s authors conducted extensive group and some one-on-one 
interviews with nineteen lawyers working in large firms in two 
cities.125  In these interviews, the researchers asked large-firm
litigators to talk about their understandings of their roles vis-à-vis 
their clients, what it means to act ethically, and their professional 
ideals.126  In a series of essays published in the Fordham Law 
Review, the researchers paint a vivid picture of large-firm lawyers’ 
ethics.127  Although the Ethics:  Beyond the Rules scholars posit 
121. Id. at 23. 
 122. See, e.g., Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, The Transformation of 
the Big Law Firm, LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES, 31–33 (Robert L. 
Nelson et al. eds., 1992); Fox, Higgins & Hilliker, Ethics Beyond the Rules 
Historical Preface, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 699.
123. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, et al., Ethics Beyond the Rules: 
Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORD. L. 
REV. 697, 701 (1998). 
 124. See Ethics: Beyond the Rules, supra note 4, at Historical Preface.  
 125. Frenkel, et al, supra note 123, at 701–02. 
 126. See id. at 691–895. 
 127. Id.
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some of the structural and market roots of large-firm lawyers’ 
ethical stances, they do not systematically investigate the link 
between the structure of lawyers’ practice environments and their 
ethics.128
In this article, I combine my findings about the logic of large 
law firms with both my preliminary findings about large-firm
lawyers’ ethics and the Ethics:  Beyond the Rules scholars’ data 
and draw conclusions about the links between the structure of large 
firms and lawyers’ ethical consciousness.  I do not posit theories to 
explain why large firms are structured as they are or how large 
firms re-make professional ideologies to rationalize their 
structures.  I take the structure of these firms as I find it and ask 
how that structure affects lawyers’ ethical consciousness.  
As Nelson and Trubek’s proposed interpretive framework for 
the study of the profession suggests, we need to understand how 
the structure of lawyers’ workplaces affect their perceptions and 
how lawyers’ perceptions, in turn, affect the structures of their 
workplaces.129   To do this effectively, we must undertake empirical 
studies capable of capturing this complex and dynamic process.  
As Robert Gordon noted in 1993:
[T]here is very little as yet written about law firms 
that gives a good feel for how market and 
organizational structures, career patterns, 
professional self-images, firm cultures, financial 
pressures, patronage networks and power 
hierarchies—running from clients to partners and 
partners to associates—condition how lawyers see 
their jobs, self-interest, loyalties, obligations, and 
practical moralities, and how these conceptions play 
out in their work.130
128. Id.
129. See Nelson & Trubek, supra note 2, at 213–14. 
 130. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the “Middle Ground,” 91 
MICH. L. REV. 2075 n.41 (1993) (citing Moral Mazes as “a wonderful study of 
business corporations in this vein”). 
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Unless we understand how careers in bureaucratic law firms 
shape the ethical approaches of the lawyers working in them, we 
cannot determine whether the changes in the structure of large 
firms and the markets they service are a cause for concern, and if 
they are, how to effectively address them.131
There are several reasons why the sort of interpretive 
sociological study Jackall undertook in large corporate 
bureaucracies has not been undertaken in large law firms.  First, it 
is difficult to do.  Empirical work of this sort requires access to 
large-firm lawyers across the country and the time for lengthy, 
one-on-one interviews.  Second, an early attempt in this direction 
may well have discouraged further study.  Erwin Smigel’s The 
Wall Street Lawyer, Professional Organization Man?, published in 
1964, was an empirical study of lawyers working in what were 
large Wall Street law firms in the mid-to-late 1950s.132  Smigel 
asked whether work in those law firm bureaucracies “breeds 
conformity and stifles creativity.”133  He concluded that, although 
Wall Street lawyers were “expedient conformit[ists]”  in their 
“nonprofessional styles of life” like dress and residence, they had 
adopted the norms of the profession which value creativity and 
independent judgment.134
While Smigel’s work was widely accepted and cited outside 
legal scholarship,135 legal academics roundly rejected his 
conclusion as suffering from flaws typical of functionalist 
analysis.136  A number of scholars “criticized these early 
131. Scholars have proposed new mechanisms for policing ethics and 
establishing ethical cultures in large law firms.  See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER’S ETHICS (Harvard 
University Press 1998); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B.Wilkins, A New 
Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 SOC. J. LEG. ETHICS 535.  We need to 
understand how lawyers in large firms experience their work in order to predict 
whether these mechanisms will be effective. 
 132. ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER, PROFESSIONAL 
ORGANIZATION MAN? (The Free Press of Glencoe 1964). 
 133. Id. at 3. 
 134. Id. at 338. 
 135. See, e.g., PARTNERS WITHOUT POWER, supra note 4, at 6 (citing 
Ouchi and others). 
 136. Functionalist analysis argues that professional “institutional structures 
are driven by the functions they were designed to implement.” Wilkins & Gulati, 
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explanations by arguing that ‘professionalism’ was merely the 
label under which law firms pursued their economic self-
interest.”137  Nelson argued that Smigel “presents an idealized and 
incomplete model of the social structure of the professional 
firm.”138  Smigel “mistakenly read this form of domination 
[collegial hierarchy] as a lack of domination.”139  Nelson notes that 
Smigel found fewer rules in the Wall Street firms he studied than 
he expected given their bureaucratic structure.140  This, Nelson 
argued, led Smigel to conclude that large firms had no need for 
extensive rules because large-firm lawyers had “internalized 
common standards of practice”141 (namely cannons of ethics) and 
that there was “little need to define the division of labor or to 
articulate powers attached to different positions in the firm’s 
hierarchy.”142  Nelson notes, “In Smigel’s conception everyone 
knows his or her place; there is little conflict, little need to justify 
the distribution of power and profits.”143  Smigel concluded that the 
collegial organization of the large Wall Street firms he studied
allowed them to maintain autonomy from their clients’ interest.144
Nelson’s empirical findings flatly controvert Smigel’s 
thesis.145  Nelson concluded that as a result of his failure to 
understand the “system of collegial domination” embedded in large 
law firms’ structures, Smigel underestimated the importance of 
these hierarchical relationships in understanding large law firms.146
Nelson noted that it is the partners who control the firm’s 
relationships with its most powerful clients who sit atop the firm 
hierarchy.  Based on his research he predicted these partners
supra note 82, at 493 n.60.  Smigel asserted that professional norms dictated the 
structure of large law firms.  SMIGEL, supra note 132, at 338. 
 137. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 514.  
 138. PARTNERS WITHOUT POWER, supra note 4, at 15. 
 139. Id. at 16.  
 140. Id. at 13–14. 
 141. Id. at 14. 
 142. Id.  
143. Id  
144. Id. at 14–15; SMIGEL, supra note 132, at 338. 
 145. PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 205–90. 
 146. Id. at 16. 
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can be expected to have internalized the client’s 
perspective on questions of social and legal policy.  
In such a collegial hierarchy the interests, indeed, 
probably the tastes, of clients will be enforced.  The 
resilience of collegial authority in the law firm will 
have the opposite effect from that posited in the 
professions literature.  Instead of producing an 
organization that is more autonomous from client 
interests, collegial authority ensures that even as the 
organization becomes more specialized internally 
and moves in the direction of bureaucratic 
organization, it will remain under the control of 
clients.147
My empirical research confirms many of the theories and 
assumptions of Galanter and Palay, and Wilkins and Gulati, about 
the way large law firms work and about the incentives of the 
lawyers who work in them.148  Moreover, many of Galanter and 
Palay’s predictions in 1990 about what large firms might look like 
in the future are borne out by my research.149  Although large firms 
are exponentially larger and substantially more bureaucratic than 
they were when Nelson wrote Partners with Power, my research 
also confirms Nelson’s thesis about the nature of power in large 
147. Id. at 227–28. 
 148. See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 82; Wilson & Gulati, supra 
note 82.  For example, Galanter & Palay theorize that large firms will become 
increasingly hierarchical in order to facilitate monitoring of the quality of their 
work product as large firms grow.  Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 807.  My 
empirical research confirms that large-firm bureaucracies have become 
increasingly hierarchical.  See text accompanying notes 177–92.  Wilkins and 
Gulati posit that large firms measure candidates for limited partnership slots 
against some “absolute standard of [human and relational] capital that translates 
into potential for the future,” and that that standard is shaped in part by external 
factors such as the market for one legal specialty over another. Wilkins & 
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1654, 1660–61. My research suggests that the external 
market factors often trump all other factors in the partnership decision.  See text 
accompanying notes 227–28. 
 149. See, e.g., Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 807 (describing “the 
‘Later’ Big Firm”). 
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law firms.150  My findings are consistent with Nelson’s conclusion 
that the dominant partners in large firms play a crucial role in 
setting the norms and creating the ideology that rationalizes those 
norms.
151
  My study also confirms Nelson’s prediction that the 
benefits of bureaucratization would drive more and more firms to 
adopt bureaucratic structures.152
By adopting a methodology similar to Jackall’s, which has 
proven useful in providing insight into corporate bureaucracies,153
I will explore how the bureaucracies created by the “partners with 
power” in today’s large firms shape the habits of mind, including 
the ethical consciousness, of the lawyers who work in them.
Although I take a more sociological approach, my findings are 
not inconsistent with the law and economics scholarship described 
above.  As Cass Sunstein has argued, “[I]ndividual rationality is a 
function of social norms.  The costs and benefits of action, from 
the standpoint of individual agents, include the consequences of 
acting inconsistently with social norms.”154  Thus, if one subscribes 
to rational choice theory, an understanding of large-firm lawyers’ 
choice of norm rules (Sunstein might call them “choice of norm” 
norms or procedural norms) is necessary for any understanding of 
the costs and benefits of action.  
In addition, I hope that my research makes two new 
contributions to this body of work.  First, I describe the rules large-
firm lawyers develop to negotiate the bureaucratic structures 
developed by the firm’s dominant partners.  Second, I posit that the 
150. See PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 113–19. 
 151. See supra notes 112–21, 145–47. 
 152. See PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 281–82. 
 153. See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm,
76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 490 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Symposium: The 
Organizational Psychology of Hyper-competition: Corporate Irresponsibility 
and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 970–71 (2002) (citing 
Jackall’s study reported in Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers as 
evidence of managers in large corporations approaches to the business and 
ethical issues they confront); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A 
Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 91 (2003).   
 154. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 909 (1996). 
4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM
660 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 4
rules, including the choice of norm rule, and the habits of mind 
lawyers develop working in large firms155 are similar to those 
Jackall identifies in large corporate bureaucracies.  Thus, I argue 
that the rules that guide large-firm lawyers and the habits of mind 
that follow from these rules are largely a function of large law 
firms’ collegial bureaucratic structure.156  Finally, I argue that the 
rules and habits of mind that large-firm bureaucracies encourage 
shape large-firm lawyers’ ethical consciousness in distinct and 
important ways.  
IV.  METHODOLOGY
Beginning in the spring of 2003, I began interviewing lawyers 
working in large law firms.  My empirical research is on-going.  In 
this article, I report on the first phase of interviews.  This 
preliminary report of my findings is based on my one-on-one 
interviews with twenty-two lawyers practicing in ten large law 
firms.  These firms ranged in size from approximately 160 lawyers 
to over 1,000 lawyers.157  They were located in large cities on the 
east and west coasts, and in the south.  All but five of the lawyers I 
interviewed were litigators.  I conducted all but two of my initial, 
in-depth interviews in person, spending from an hour and a half to 
three hours with each lawyer.  I conducted follow-up interviews 
with six of these lawyers, some in person and some by telephone, 
during which I asked them to interpret the material I was 
collecting.  In total, I conducted thirty interviews.
The lawyers I interviewed included junior and senior 
associates, salaried non-partnership track lawyers, non-equity, and 
equity partners.  A number of them had management 
responsibilities in their firms.  They included a team leader, several 
practice group leaders, a department head for a large metropolitan 
155. See infra note 233–40 and accompanying text.  
 156. As Nelson noted, the partners in large law firms with relationships 
with powerful clients dictate the management structure of large firms.  NELSON,
supra note 4, at 16, 112. 
157. Five of the firms were among the fifty largest firms in the country, 
and all of the firms were among the largest 250 law firms in the country in 2003, 
according to the National Law Journal.  The NLJ 250, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 24, 
2003, at S10. 
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office, a firm-wide department head, and a former managing 
partner.  I also interviewed a third year law student who had been a 
summer associate at a large law firm during the summer of 2003.  
Sixteen of my interviewees were men and six were women.  Two 
interviewees were Asian-American; one was African-American; all 
others were Caucasian-Americans.
The lawyers I interviewed were not chosen at random.  
Instead, I used personal connections to gain access to large-firm
lawyers.  I asked friends, colleagues, and former colleagues to 
suggest large-firm lawyers with whom I could speak.  Some of 
these lawyers made initial calls to lawyers they knew and asked 
whether I could contact them.  Others gave me the name of a 
lawyer and told me to use their names when I introduced myself 
and my project.  Some of the lawyers I interviewed introduced me 
to still other lawyers.  All of the lawyers I interviewed spoke with 
me on the condition that they and their firms remain anonymous.  I 
have changed all names, and sometimes other identifying 
information, including in some instances gender information, to 
protect the identities of those lawyers and their respective firms.  
With one exception, I found the lawyers I interviewed to be eager 
to talk about their work and lives in large law firms.  I took 
handwritten notes of my interviews and subsequently typed them 
myself or had them typed for me.
The sample of lawyers involved in my study is not intended to 
be statistically representative.  However, the twenty-two lawyers I 
spoke with had diverse professional backgrounds.  Some had spent 
their entire careers in the same firm; some had come to their firms 
as lateral associates or partners.  They also had diverse practice 
concentrations.  Notwithstanding these differences, their 
geographic diversity, and the range of seniority and managerial 
responsibilities represented, my in-depth interviews revealed 
remarkable consistency in these lawyers’ experiences of work in 
large law firms.  
Within large firms, I focused my initial research primarily on 
litigators.158  I did so for two reasons.  First, litigators’ working 
ethics represent an exceptionally influential paradigm of legal 
158. The next phase of my empirical research is focused on transactional 
lawyers. 
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ethics; non-litigators adopt litigators’ adversarial norms even when 
their work does not involve adversary proceedings.159  As David 
Luban noted, “Lawyers commonly act as though the standard 
conception [the duty of a lawyer in an adversary proceeding to 
zealously represent his client’s position] characterizes their 
relationship with clients even when the representations do not 
involve the courtroom.”160  Thus, understanding how the logic of 
large law firm bureaucracies shapes litigators’ working ethics may 
indicate how the increasing bureaucratization of legal workplaces 
shapes the working ethics of non-litigators as well.161  In addition, 
large-firm litigators are actively engaged in the ongoing 
discourse—the regular dialogue among plaintiffs’ lawyers, defense 
lawyers, clients and the court—by which litigation ethics are 
defined and redefined.162  Understanding the organizational 
influences on large-firm litigators is, therefore, essential to 
understanding the development of litigation ethics.  Second, I 
focused on large-firm litigators because doing so allowed me to 
build upon data in the Ethics: Beyond the Rules study, which was 
focused on litigators.163
In conducting these interviews, I tried to understand how these 
large-firm lawyers viewed and experienced their work.  I asked 
them about their interactions with colleagues within the firm, as 
well as with clients and adversaries.  I asked who succeeds in their 
firms and why.  I also asked them how they make decisions.  In 
159. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 57–
58 (1988). 
 160. Id. at 57 (arguing that the standard conception of the lawyer’s role as 
a partisan advocate who is not morally accountable for his actions only applies 
in the context of litigation and that the principles of partisanship and non-
accountability should not apply when lawyers work outside of an adjudicatory 
proceeding) (citing Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and 
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 672 (1978)).  
 161. In my own research, I did not find differences in the ways litigators 
and non-litigators in large firms experience the worlds of their firms. 
 162. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 867 (noting that “[l]itigation ethics do 
not exist in the abstract, but rather are constantly being constructed from 
litigators’ day-to-day routines.  Standards of conduct come from neither 
individual attorneys nor from individual firms, but rather from the larger system 
of the profession as a whole”). 
 163. See Ethics:  Beyond the Rules, supra note 4, at 692. 
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response, they told me stories, a number of which are recounted 
here.164  The social, cognitive and evaluative rules large-firm 
lawyers develop and live by emerge from these stories.  It is these 
rules that, I argue, are likely shaping lawyers’ ethical 
consciousness.
V.  THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF LARGE LAW FIRMS
To understand how large-firm lawyers experience their 
worlds, one must first understand the social structure of large law 
firms.  How is the firm’s work organized?  Who reports to whom?  
What kinds of decisions need to be made, and who makes them?  
Although every firm is unique, and although large-firm lawyers 
believe that their firms differ substantially in terms of their culture, 
the structure of the bureaucracies that have developed in these 
firms is remarkably similar.  As noted in Part III above, a number 
of other scholars have described the general structure of large law 
firms and referred to many of the specific features of large-firm
structure in the course of their work.165  In this section, I describe in 
some detail the common structural features of the firms I studied in 
2003 and 2004.  Because I posit that the structure of large firms 
influences lawyers’ ethical consciousness, I endeavor to provide a 
more comprehensive description of the structure than is contained 
in much of the earlier scholarship.  Most of what I describe here is 
generally consistent with that scholarship; however, many of the 
firms I studied have developed more elaborate management 
bureaucracies than those described in earlier studies.166
164. Certainly, there is more to be learned about large law firms.  This 
article is the first report of an ongoing research project that I hope will continue 
to provide rich data about the experience of work in large law firms.  There is 
also much to be learned through comparative studies.  For instance, it would be 
useful to compare lawyers’ experience of work in large firms with a similar 
study of lawyers working in small, non-bureaucratic firms and to examine 
whether and how differences in their experience impact their working ethics. 
 165. See text accompanying notes 81–128. 
 166. See, e.g., Galanter & Palay who describe less elaborate management 
structures.  Galanter & Palay, supra note 82.  However, both Galanter & Palay 
and Nelson predict that the management structures will become more elaborate. 
Id. at 807 (describing the “Later” Big Firm); PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra 
note 4, at 273–75. 
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All large law firms are made up of partners and associates, 
and most employ a number of salaried lawyers who are not on the 
partnership track.167  Of the ten firms I studied, seven have a two-
tiered partnership, consisting of equity partners and non-equity 
partners.168  Equity partners own the firm.  Non-equity partners are 
not owners, but typically may vote on all issues that come before 
the partnership, with the exception of promotion to equity partner.  
The partners, associates and non-partnership track lawyers in these 
firms engage in two types of work.  First, they provide legal 
services for the firm’s clients, and second, to varying degrees, they 
contribute to managing the firm itself.  In my research, I studied 
how large law firms structure both the legal work lawyers perform 
for clients, and the work of managing the business of the firm.  
A.  The Structure of Litigation Work in Large Law Firms
Litigation work in large firms is organized hierarchically 
around cases, with the lawyer responsible for the relationship with 
the client at the top of the hierarchy.  A client will hire a lawyer to 
handle a lawsuit.  That lawyer may supervise work on the case 
himself or he may assign management of the case to a trusted 
colleague, a partner, or senior associate.169  I refer to the lawyer 
who manages the case as the “case manager.”  The number of 
other lawyers assigned to the case will vary depending on the 
complexity and stakes involved.  A complex, high stakes case may 
require four, five, or more lawyers, while a simple case may 
require only the case manager and one or two junior lawyers.  The 
167. Accord MARC GALANTER & THOMAS M. PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF 
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 64–66 (1991) 
(discussing changes in structure of large law firms and the growth of a class of 
permanent salaried employees who are not eligible to be promoted to partner). 
168. I refer to partners here as either equity partners (meaning owners) or 
non-equity partners.  The titles used to distinguish partnership status vary from 
firm to firm.  In addition to “equity” and “non-equity” partners, firms refer to 
partners as “capital” and “non-capital” partners, and as “senior” and “junior” 
partners. 
 169. I generally use the terms “he” or “his” when I refer to a generic 
lawyer to allow for easier reading.  Where I refer to the comments of one of my 
subjects, I use the appropriate personal pronouns, except in those instances 
where I changed gender information to protect an interviewees’ identity. 
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lawyer initially hired by the client, the case manager (if not the 
lawyer who brought the work in), and the lawyers working for 
them on a case make up the case hierarchy.  These case hierarchies 
are independent in the sense that partners outside the case 
hierarchy do not question or otherwise monitor how a case
manager and his team handle a case.
Within the case hierarchy, the case manager is primarily 
responsible for contact with the client, and he supervises the work 
of junior lawyers on the case.  Typically, the case manager decides 
major strategy questions and appears at all significant court 
proceedings.  The junior lawyers on the case research legal issues 
and write memos summarizing their findings; they draft briefs; 
they draft discovery requests; and they respond to the other party’s 
discovery requests.  They may also take and defend depositions 
and prepare experts.  In this process, some case managers are very 
“hands-on” and review and revise every document drafted by the 
lawyers who work for them.  Other case managers are less 
directive, while still demanding that junior lawyers’ work meet 
their expectations.
Litigation partners and senior associates who do not bring 
clients into the firm, must form alliances with one, or more, of the 
firm’s powerful partners with important client relationships who 
can provide them with work.  The lawyers with important client 
relationships who sit at the top of the case hierarchies are 
colloquially referred to as “rainmakers,” “queen bees,” 
“originators,” and/or “finders.”  Often a lawyer who does not have 
clients of his own is assigned to manage a case for a client of 
another lawyer in the firm.  If this case manager has strong client 
relationship and case management skills, he may be able to 
increase the amount of work coming from the client.  For instance, 
the client may give him more of its litigation work.  Lawyers with 
these skills are sometimes referred to as “binders” because they 
cement and expand relationships with existing clients.  The best 
binders form such strong relationships with clients that if they 
leave their firms, some clients may move with them. 
Working for the finders and binders are the “minders.”170
Minders may be senior associates learning how to manage cases 
170. There are several variations of this phrase in use.  Some lawyers I 
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and clients.  A minder might also be a non-equity partner with 
good legal skills who has not yet demonstrated the ability to form 
strong enough relationships with clients to expand the business 
coming from the client.  Until these lawyers can develop their own 
client relationships, they are entirely dependent on finders and 
binders at the firm for work, and thus, for their job security.  In all 
of the firms I studied, minders’ billable hours were tracked and 
compared and billable hour expectations were significant.
Some minders never develop into binders or finders.  At some 
firms, these lawyers may be promoted to non-equity partner and 
maintain that status indefinitely.  At others, they may be employed 
as “counsel” or “staff attorney” or in some other non-partner status 
position.  At still other firms, lawyers who cannot find or bind 
work have a limited tenure and are forced out at the time of the 
non-equity partner or the equity partner election, if not before.  
Notwithstanding the differences in the prospects for minders 
among large firms, in every firm I studied, minders were viewed as 
easily replaceable.
While the structure of litigation work described here is not 
new, complex management bureaucracies have been superimposed 
on these case hierarchies relatively recently.171  The intersection of 
the structure of legal work in large firms and the new business 
interviewed used the terms finders, binders, and grinders.  It is unclear where the 
terms finders, binders, minders and grinders originated; however, the terms were 
used by a number of the lawyers I interviewed, and they have been incorporated 
into socio-legal lexicon describing the status hierarchy in large law firms.  See,
e.g., NELSON, supra note 4, at 69–77. 
171. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 857 which notes: 
Elite lawyers are also experiencing a significant 
bureaucratization of their professional workplaces.  As 
documented, the size of the nation’s leading law firms has 
grown dramatically in recent decades.  With very few 
exceptions, elite outside counsel . . . now work in 
‘partnerships’ of literally hundreds of attorneys, often spread 
among offices in several states or even countries . . . . As law 
firms grow and diversify, informal social structures and face-
to-face contacts no longer suffice to bind these organizations 
together, and a new regime of formal hierarchy, record-
keeping, and evaluation has begun to emerge. 
Id. 
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structures that have been imposed on them is profitability.  Those 
partners at the top of the case hierarchies, who maintain 
relationships with the firms’ most lucrative clients, have power in 
the growing bureaucracies that manage large law firms today.172
As one lawyer put it, profitability is the “coin of the realm” in 
today’s large law firm bureaucracies.  Only the most profitable 
finders and binders will have what another of the lawyers I 
interviewed referred to as the “moral authority” to be elected to, 
and successfully maintain, leading roles in these new management 
bureaucracies.
B.  The Structure of the Business Bureaucracy of the Large Law 
Firm
In Partners with Power, Nelson identified the defining 
features of a bureaucratic law firm.  First, bureaucratic firms have 
“a specialized policy-making group that actively engages in 
strategic planning.”173  Second, these firms have “a developed 
administrative component consisting of a managing partner and a 
mechanism for collecting and analyzing data on the financial 
performance of individual lawyers and work groups.”174  Third, 
bureaucratic firms have “well-defined work groups (usually taking 
the form of departments) with recognized heads who supervise the 
group and report to the central policy-making group.”175
All of the firms involved in my study meet Nelson’s criteria.  
First, all have a policy-making group made up of the managing 
partner(s),176 often the department heads, or a subset of them, and 
172. Accord PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 224 (noting that 
“[b]ureaucratization in the law firm will always be subject to the prerogatives of 
the client responsible elite”).  
173. Id. at 91. 
 174. Id.  
175. Id.  
176. Firms have a variety of titles for the lawyer-manager at the apex of 
the firm’s management bureaucracy, most frequently “managing partner,” or 
“chairman.”  Some firms have two managing partners.  This often occurs when 
the firm is the product of a merger of two firms of relatively equal power.  In 
firms where the “chairman” is the lawyer at the apex, there may be one or more 
“managing partners” working under the chairman.  In these circumstances, the 
managing partner’s duties may be primarily administrative with decision-
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several other powerful “client-responsible”177 partners in the firm.  
These partners form one or more managing committees.  The title 
of these committees varies from firm to firm.178  As Nelson 
predicted,179 a primary responsibility of the managing partner(s) 
and the managing committee(s) that assist him is strategic
planning.  Many firms hire consultants to aid managers in this 
process.  Against the backdrop of the strategic plan, the managing 
partner and managing committee(s) make decisions about mergers 
and acquisitions, associate hiring, who makes non-equity partner 
and equity partner, whether to de-equitize a partner, conflicts of 
interest, and the criteria for compensation.
In most of the firms I studied, the partnership retains authority 
to vote to approve decisions about who makes partner, but this vote 
seems to be a formality in most large firms where many partners 
do not know one another, much less all the candidates for non-
equity and equity partner.  In some of the smaller large firms I 
studied, the equity partners maintain some greater degree of 
control over compensation decisions by electing a compensation 
committee to make compensation decisions or recommendations.  
However, senior management usually plays a significant role in 
designing the criteria for compensation.  Although the equity 
partners typically sign off on mergers and acquisitions, senior 
management does the strategic planning to determine whether the 
making authority residing in the chairman.  I use the term “managing partner” 
here to refer to the partner at the apex of the management bureaucracy. 
 177. The term “client responsibility” was coined by Robert Nelson, in 
Partners with Power to “refer to the control of a client account by a particular 
lawyer.”  PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 91. 
 178. These committees are referred to as the “management committee,” 
“executive committee,” “operations committee,” “governing committee,” and 
“policy committee,” to name a few. 
 179. PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 274 states: 
The processes of growth and specialization introduce 
additional pressures for firms to develop bureaucratic 
managerial, administrative and work group structures.  At the 
managerial level, it will become increasingly apparent that 
some group within the organization must plan strategically for 
firms to defend their client bases or take advantage of new 
opportunities.  Hence, the role of leading partners will become 
more distinct from that of the rest of the organization. 
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firm should consider merger and does the due diligence required to 
evaluate a proposed merger.  Senior management then goes to the 
equity partnership with a recommendation about merger and the 
partnership accepts or rejects their proposal. 
In some firms, many of the most profitable partners sit on the 
committees that make the most significant decisions affecting the 
firm.  Even if they are not on those committees, however, the 
managing partner(s) and the lawyer-managers working with them 
must have “buy-in” (meaning support) from those highly profitable 
partners to wield the influence necessary to obtain approval from 
the partnership for mergers, reformulations of the compensation 
criteria, and other significant changes.180
Second, in keeping with Nelson’s criteria, all of the firms I 
studied have established elaborate mechanisms for tracking the 
profitability of individual lawyers.  Today, partners are evaluated 
principally on the profitability of the work they manage rather than 
the hours they bill.  Firms keep data on the hours worked on a case, 
the fees billed to the client,181 the fees actually collected (known in 
some firms as the “realization” rate),182 the time required to collect 
fees,183 and the overhead chargeable to the partner.  Data on each 
180. Most of the firms I studied also appointed an “office managing 
partner,” a lawyer-manager for each office of the firm.  Office managing 
partners are typically responsible for administration of their office staff and 
facilities.  In some firms, the office managing partners also have a role in 
strategic planning for their offices, and thus, are expected to have an 
understanding of the market for all of the practices within their offices, not just 
for their own specialties.  Typically, the office managing partner reports to the 
managing partner and/or the management committee.  Some firms also include 
regional office managing partners or representatives on the key management 
committee(s). 
 181. A partner may write off some of the time he and the lawyers working 
on a case spent on a task; thus, the fees billed may vary from the time spent. 
 182. It is not uncommon for clients to try to negotiate fees after time is 
billed. 
 183. Fees paid 120 days after billing are worth less to the firm than fees 
paid thirty or sixty days after billing.  Consequently, many firms track a 
partner’s “turn around time,” meaning the time it takes a partner’s clients to pay 
their bills. 
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partner are tracked and compared with other partners’ numbers.  A 
number of firms also track the profitability of practice groups.184
Finally, consistent with Nelson’s criteria, in all of the firms I 
studied, lawyers are organized by specialty into well defined work 
groups most often referred to as practice groups.  In many firms, 
these practice groups are coming to be viewed as individual “profit 
centers.”  All lawyers in the firm are members of one or more 
practice groups.185  Some firms subdivide practice groups into 
narrower areas of specialization, often referred to as teams.  
Lawyers may be members of multiple teams.  The practice groups 
are usually grouped into larger departments.  A firm may have 
three departments: Litigation, Business, and Real Estate.  The 
litigation department will consist of a number of practice groups 
organized by specialty and sometimes with reference to the 
industry served.  A lawyer who specializes in securities litigation 
may be a member of the securities litigation team, within the 
business litigation practice group, which is a part of the litigation 
department.  All ten of the firms I studied have offices in more 
than one city and the practice group organization described above 
transcends geography.
Each firm has developed multi-layered hierarchies of lawyer-
managers under the managing partner and the management 
committee, who manage the departments and practice groups.  The 
titles of the lawyers who manage practice groups vary from firm to 
firm: for example, “leader,” “chair,” or “head.”186  These practice 
group leaders typically report to their department heads, who 
report to the managing partner(s) and/or managing committees.187
184. In one firm lawyers reported that although firm management claims 
that it does not track the profitability of practice groups, the firm has this data 
and considers it when deciding how to divvy up points among equity partners 
and whether to elevate a lawyer to non-equity or equity partner status. 
 185. Although some of the firms studied tout systems that allow associates 
to try various practices before specializing, lawyers in those firms reported 
associates are under significant pressure to specialize early, certainly within the 
first several years of practice. 
 186. I refer to these lawyers here as practice group leaders. 
 187. In some firms, when a critical mass of lawyers within a specialty is 
located in one office, a manager, who reports to the firm-wide practice group 
leader, is appointed for the practice group within that geographic office.  For 
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Practice group leaders’ management authority often impinges 
significantly on the autonomy of the lawyers working within the 
group.  For instance, practice group leaders are typically 
gatekeepers for the work of the practice group.  They must approve 
any new work a lawyer wants to bring into the group by criteria 
relating to the type of work and the fee arrangements proposed.  
Although at the time of my interviews, none of the firms I studied 
paid lawyers according to the profitability of their practice group,
the profitability of practice groups is a crucial factor in the 
competition for resources among practice groups.  For example, 
management is unlikely to recommend elevating non-equity 
partners to equity partner in practice groups that are not profitable. 
Similarly, management may not assign new associates to less 
profitable practice groups.  Consequently, practice group leaders 
watch the profitability of their groups closely and have an 
incentive to refuse to allow a lawyer in the group to take on work 
they believe will not be sufficiently profitable. 
In addition, practice group leaders generally control the 
practice group’s resources (human and non human) and decide 
how to distribute those resources within the group.  The resources 
controlled by the practice group leaders vary somewhat from firm 
to firm.  Generally, they control the budget for equipment and for 
conferences.  In many firms, they also assign associates to work on 
cases or select the lawyer who will allocate work to associates.  
Thus, when a partner needs an associate to work on a case, he 
generally must ask the practice group leader or work allocator to 
assign an associate.  If the partner approaches the associate himself 
about working on a case, he usually obtains the practice group 
leader’s or work allocator’s, formal or informal, acquiescence to 
the assignment.  In addition, practice group leaders are sometimes 
in a position to select the lawyers within the group who will 
participate in “client pitches,” and thus, who will have an 
opportunity to share the credit for obtaining a new client.188
instance, the firm may appoint a partner in the securities litigation practice group 
to lead the Los Angeles office.  The securities litigation practice group manager 
for the Los Angeles office then reports to the securities litigation practice group 
leader for the firm, who happens to be located in the New York office. 
 188. “Credit” may be formal or informal.  Some firms’ compensation 
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Practice group leaders also play a role in the evaluation of 
lawyers within the group.  In some firms, the practice group leader 
coordinates the regular evaluation of associates within the group.  
In most firms, associates and non-equity partners need the support 
of their practice group leaders to be promoted.
Practice group leaders serve as the group’s official liaison 
with firm management.  So, for instance, when a practice group 
seeks resources (e.g., when the group wants to hire new associates, 
paralegals, or staff, or have associates elevated to partner) it is 
typically the practice group leader who makes the group’s case to 
senior management.  In order to garner these resources, a practice 
group leader must ensure that their group is profitable and that the 
group is highly valued in the firm’s strategic plan.  Often, only 
those practice groups that are profitable, and/or have a primary 
place in the strategic plan, can expect their associates to make 
partner and their non-equity partners to become equity partners.
In addition, practice group leaders advocate for lawyers in 
their groups when management has to act to avoid conflicts of 
interest.  While conflict checks are not new, as firms have grown, 
conflicts of interest have become more common and often pit 
partners or practice groups against one another.  Each group wants 
to take on the new work to improve its profitability.  When a 
conflict cannot be waived and the firm has to choose what work to 
pursue, decisions about which client to take and which to turn 
away are made at the highest levels of firm management.  Senior 
management typically makes these decisions by reference to 
profitability and the strategic plan.  Practice group leaders are often 
involved in making the case to firm management that the work 
their groups want to take on fits within the firm’s strategic plan.
Unlike the managing partner, practice group leaders are not 
necessarily the most profitable lawyers in the group.  In many 
firms, a number of practice group leaders are young equity 
partners, who are perceived as rising stars in terms of profitability, 
and as having the people skills that will enable them to manage 
formulas give lawyers credit for participating in successful pitches.  In other 
firms, although a lawyer may not receive compensation credit, participating in a 
pitch contributes to the perception that a lawyer is a business generator.  The 
importance of these perceptions is discussed in Part VI.C. 
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partners, associates, and any factions within their practice 
groups.189  The power actually exercised by practice group leaders 
varies greatly from practice group to practice group and from firm 
to firm.190  Some practice group leaders are proactive managers and 
leaders.  In other practice groups, the most powerful equity 
partners in the group are not appointed leader because they lack 
management skills.  Even so, in some cases these partners refuse to 
allow anyone else to make decisions of any consequence.  In these 
groups, the job of practice group leader is largely ministerial, i.e., 
keeping track of data and passing information up and down the 
ladder.  The role that the practice group leader plays in a given 
group can have significant consequences for lawyers working 
within the group.191
Although a powerful practice group leader may limit the 
autonomy of many lawyers within the group, profitable partners 
may be able to purchase a degree of autonomy that others in the 
group cannot.  For instance, while a firm may officially require all 
partners to prepare a business plan, a practice group leader may 
ignore the requirement for a very profitable partner, or a highly 
profitable partner may be able to charge a client a lower hourly rate 
than other partners would be permitted to charge for a new matter.  
Lawyers at the highest levels of management identify one of the 
central tensions in large firms today as whether management is 
able to control decisions in the areas outlined above, i.e., whether 
management can decline to follow the wishes of a significant 
partner and still maintain power.
The power of the managers of today’s large law firm 
bureaucracies described above has created a whole new fealty 
ladder that lawyers within the firm must learn to climb.  In addition 
to negotiating the hierarchies inherent in the structure of the legal 
189. In one firm I studied, the majority of the practice group leaders were 
what were known as “service partners,” binders who work for the firm’s
powerful finders. 
 190. A number of firms I studied were discussing giving greater authority 
to practice group leaders at the time of my interviews.  For instance, one firm 
was considering giving practice group leaders authority to decide some portion 
of the lawyers’ compensation.  See also Terry Carter, New Roles for Group 
Leaders, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2004, at 32.  
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 44–47. 
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work of the firm, lawyers in large firms now must also negotiate 
multiple layers of relatively complex management bureaucracies.192
C.  Conflicts and Tensions, Incentives and Motivations
The pressure of the profitability imperative on these large-firm
bureaucracies creates the central conflicts, tensions, incentives, and 
motivations affecting large-firm lawyers.  Changes in the market 
for corporate legal services have been widely discussed in the legal 
scholarship.193  As large corporations are hiring in-house counsel, 
more of a corporation’s routine legal work is done in-house.194
192. These new management bureaucracies are certainly more complex 
than those described by Smigel and even those described by Nelson in 1988.  
See supra notes 132–144, 102–106 and accompanying text.  Galanter and Palay, 
however, predicted this change.  See supra note 149.  To date, no commentators 
have interviewed large-firm lawyers regarding the impact of these more 
elaborate management bureaucracies and the organizational logic they bring 
with them.   
 193. Several authors have discussed the growth in the number of in-house 
lawyers as being responsible for increasing competition among large law firms 
for clients.  See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 4, at 8 noting that:  
The transformation in the legal needs of the corporation 
transformed the market for large-firm services.  The 
emergence of new functions for the corporate law firm was 
also associated with the decline of its traditional practice base.  
Routine corporate matters were taken over by inside counsel . 
. . the firm’s relationships with corporate clients underwent a 
discernable change.  Continuous broad-ranging relationships 
between firms and corporate clients were increasingly 
displaced by a series of ad hoc, case-by-case, field-by-field 
relationships between a corporation and many law firms.  
Suchman, supra note 10, at 856–57 (explaining that “many corporate clients 
have responded to rising legal costs by augmenting their in-house counsel’s 
offices, making these companies into unprecedentedly informed consumers of 
professional services”).  
194. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 167, at 46–50. The authors describe 
the growth in size of in-house counsel departments and as the size of these 
departments has grown so has the amount of work being brought in house and 
state that: 
A series of surveys by Altman & Weil found that, from 1976 
to 1982, the percentage of firms reporting in-house counsel do 
three-quarters of the corporations legal work increased from 
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Large corporations view the outside legal services they purchase as 
a commodity.195  They typically enter the legal marketplace looking 
for services on a project by project, case by case basis196 or they 
may hire one firm to do all of a particular type of legal work.197
For example, a corporation might hire one, or a few firms, to 
handle its entire products liability defense.  Corporations shop for 
firms to do this work, and a number of firms may compete for the 
business.  Many firms have opened offices in multiple cities in an 
attempt to make themselves attractive to large corporations with a 
need for legal services in many regions of the country.198  As a 
result, firms no longer “own” the work they do because there is 
always a competitor waiting in the wings trying to steal the client 
away.
Further, firms’ relationships with their clients are often built 
on personal relationships with in-house lawyers who face 
uncertainty themselves.  A former managing partner of a large 
national firm explained:
56.0 percent to 66.5 percent . . . . While law departments 
formerly confined themselves to processing routine corporate 
legal matters and left major transactions and litigation work to 
outside counsel, they are now undertaking more work that 
once would have gone to outside lawyers.  Some in-house 
counsel now conduct some or all of their own litigation . . . . 
The relation of corporate law departments to outside counsel 
has shifted from comprehensive and enduring retainer 
relationships toward less exclusive and more task-specific ad 
hoc arrangements . . . . In their relationship with outside law 
firms, today’s enlarged corporate legal departments impose 
budgetary restraints, exert more control over cases, demand 
periodic reports, and engage in comparison shopping among 
firms. 
 195. Id. at 46–50. 
196. Id.  
197. The phenomenon of firms competing for business has been 
documented by other scholars, and in the popular legal press.  See, e.g.,
Suchman, supra note 10, at 856–57 (describing increase in competitive pressure 
among firms).  These competitions are sometimes fought out in what are called 
“beauty contests” or “client pitches.” 
 198. GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 167, at 46–50.
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It is very hard to “own” business today.  In-house 
counsel who is your friend loses his job.  Now you 
need to scramble for work.  There were many e-
mails within the firm where a lawyer was asking if 
anyone knew of job for Joe X [who just lost his in-
house position].  If you can find Joe an in-house 
position, you can secure work [for yourself and the 
firm]—if not, you’re out of luck.
Even if a partner’s relationship with a client is secure, he faces 
contingencies within his firm.  For instance, firm management may 
decide to increase the firm’s billing rates beyond what a partner’s 
clients are willing to pay.  This partner must either find new clients 
or resign and take his existing clients to a firm that charges lower 
rates.
As corporate clients have become less loyal to the firms they 
hire, lawyers have become less loyal to the firms that employ 
them.199  When large firms had long-term, stable relationships with 
their clients, a retiring senior partner could “hand down” or 
“bequeath” a client to a more junior partner.200  The ability to pass a 
client down the generations encouraged strong loyalties among 
lawyers in a firm.  Because most large firms do not own work 
today, junior lawyers cannot count on inheriting work from their 
elders; they must think differently about their careers.  As a former 
managing partner explained, “Today, a lawyer needs to build 
skills.  Yesterday, a lawyer needed to build a practice.  A lawyer 
today is more of a hired gun, less the owner of a small business.” 
While these changes were occurring, the popular legal press 
was born,201 and the American Lawyer began reporting firms’ 
199. Id. at 54–55 (documenting the increase in lateral movement of 
lawyers and groups of lawyers from one firm to another beginning in the 
1970’s). 
 200. See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL 
ORGANIZATION MAN? 234–35 (The Free Press of Glencoe 1969) (identifying the 
lawyers who “inherit” the firms largest clients as the lawyers who controlled the 
Wall Street firms he studied).  
201. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 68–76 (documenting the 
chronological development of the legal press).  The authors’ reference Erwin 
Smigel’s work in The Wall Street Lawyer, reporting that in the 1950’s firms kept 
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“profits per partner.”202  As a result, lawyers in large firms can, and 
do, compare what they earn to what they think lawyers in 
comparable firms are earning and may change firms if they think 
they can make more money or have access to more resources.203
To attract profitable laterals to their firms, management strives 
to keep the firm’s profits per partner number high.  To do this, 
managers must keep the number of equity partners small.  This 
creates another of the primary tensions in large firms.  Most equity 
partners in large firms rely on non-equity partners or senior 
associates to manage their cases for them.  To keep those lawyers 
motivated, equity partners need to be able to hold out a realistic 
possibility that these lawyers will be elected equity partners.  
However, as the pressure grows to keep the equity partnership 
small, the odds of making equity partner in the large law firms I 
studied, and in large firms across the country, have become far 
worse.
204
information about partnership agreements, finances, client lists and salaries 
confidential. Id. The authors credit the Supreme Court decision in Bates v. State 
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), with giving birth to the legal press because 
lawyers could talk to reporters about their practices without being accused of 
advertising.  Id. Reporting about lawyers and the practice of law increased in 
both The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. For example, by the late 
1970s, several national law publications, including The American Lawyer and 
The National Law Journal, began reporting on the internal workings of the 
profession including firm’s hiring policies, marketing strategies, clients, fee 
structures and compensation.  Id.
202. The American Lawyer began publishing “profits per partner” among 
the nation’s top law firms in 1984.  A Guide To Our Methodology, AM. LAW., 
Aug. 2003, at 85.  All of the lawyers I spoke to about these statistics were highly 
skeptical about their accuracy.  The American Lawyer claims it gathers the data 
it uses to determine profits per partner from both official and unofficial sources.  
Id. The “official” sources are members of large-firm management committees 
who are willing to provide information.  Id.  According to The American 
Lawyer, for the firms that refuse to provide information, the reporters obtain 
information from “unofficial” sources—members of these firms who provided 
the information anonymously.  Id. 
203. See  Suchman, supra note 10, at 856–57.  
 204. See NELSON, supra note 4, at 3 (describing the changes in large-firm 
practice and how firms “have raised the threshold for full partnership by 
lengthening the number of years required before admission to partnership, 
inserting intermediate levels of partnership, and conferring partnership status on 
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The lowered odds of making equity partner create a 
competition among practice groups, and sometimes between non-
equity partners within practice groups, for a limited number of 
equity partnership seats.  Profitability and management’s strategic 
plan are key determinants in this competition.  For instance, the 
strategic plan may call for the firm to position itself as specializing 
in providing legal services for the financial services industry.  
Management will devote resources, marketing expenditures, new 
hires, and equity partnership seats to those practice groups that 
service that industry.  Because the products liability practice group 
does not serve the financial services industry, lawyers in that group 
are unlikely to be promoted to equity partner.
In addition, even the most successful partners in large firms 
face contingencies and uncertainty they did not face thirty years 
ago.  In all of the firms I studied, there was talk of de-equitizing 
partners who had not been profitable for a number of years in order 
to keep the firm’s profits per partner number up.205  An equity 
only a small percentage of any entering cohort”); Marie Beaudette, Associates 
Leave Firms in Droves, Becoming Partner Is No Longer a Priority—And If It Is, 
It Is a Difficult Goal, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 6, 2003, at C4 (reporting the results of a 
NALP Foundation study showing large numbers of associates leaving firms 
before making partner).  One of the reasons for the exodus is the remote chances 
of becoming partner.  Id.   “In large part, associates believe making partner is 
out of their grasp, either because the standards are unfairly applied or because 
firms don’t want to slice up their profits further, the study found.”  Id. See also,
Nathan Koppel, The Cahill Way, AM. LAW., July 2003 at 92 (describing the 
promotion practices of the second most profitable firm in The American Law 
100’s most profitable firm ranking, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel.  “Every year 
Cahill generally hires 30–40 new associates, and it makes, on average, fewer 
than two new partners.  In the last 14 years . . . .  the firm has made 26 new 
partners.”); Martha Neil, Brave, New World of Partnership, A.B.A. J., Jan. 
2004, at 30–33 (reporting that firms now use a two-tier partnership track 
extending the time it takes to make equity partner and that among associates that 
can put in the hours necessary to be considered for partnership status, “[o]nly a 
small fraction of associates are eventually offered partnership.”  The article also 
quotes an attorney in a large Manhattan firm describing the path to partnership 
as “[i]t’s not enough to be just a really good lawyer in competing for partnership 
. . . [y]ou have to be a really good lawyer, in the right practice area, in the right 
time in the economy.  There are so many variables that are just beyond anyone’s 
control.”). 
205. A lawyer who was a high level manager in his firm noted that most 
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partner explained, “All firms have dead wood,206 some are more 
successful at cleaning [it] out than others . . . . The firm has to have 
a carrot and a stick to keep people in line.”  An equity partner in 
another firm agreed, “[The firm needs to] cut out the dogs.  Get rid 
of the partner whose practice has died.  Every two to three years 
[the firm needs to] look closely and make the hard decisions—look 
at production versus salary.  Nip the thing in the bud and de-
equitize the couch potatoes.”  Many of the lawyers I interviewed 
reported that their firms had already de-equitized partners, and 
others suggested that de-equitizing was imminent.
VI.  THE WORLD OF LARGE-FIRM LITIGATORS
Large-firm lawyers develop stated and unstated rules—what 
sociologists would call “rules-in-use”—to negotiate the 
uncertainties, conflicts, and tensions created by the bureaucracies 
in which they work.  These rules-in-use guide their decisions about 
whom to work for, how to behave, how to deal with clients and 
adversaries, and what legal and professional judgments to make.  
Among these rules-in-use is what I refer to as a choice of norm 
rule.  The rules-in-use at work in large law firms, including the 
choice of norm rule, shape the way large-firm lawyers think, what 
sociologists call their “habits of mind.”207  The rules-in-use and 
habits of mind at work in large firms are evident in lawyers’ stories 
about their experiences in their firms.
When asked who succeeds and advances in large law firm 
bureaucracies and why,208 lawyers talked about understanding what 
is expected of them and meeting those expectations.  For lawyers 
firms’ partnership agreements do not provide for “de-equitizing,” but he had 
never heard of anyone challenging the practice. 
 206. Equity partners who are not profitable are referred to as “dead wood” 
in many firms. 
 207. See, e.g., JACKALL, supra note 6 (describing the habits of mind of 
corporate managers). 
208. I did not begin my study asking large-firm lawyers which associates 
succeeded in their firms and why, but I quickly discovered that this was what 
large-firm lawyers were interested in talking about.  I came to understand that a 
discussion of who succeeds and why provided a window into the rules-in-use 
and habits of mind of large-firm lawyers. 
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who do not generate their own business, this means understanding 
what the lawyers above them in the case hierarchy expect.209  These 
lawyers must know how the lawyers who supervise them expect 
work to be done and expect them to behave in any given situation.  
With the exception of those lawyers who are so profitable as to be 
able to purchase substantial autonomy, large-firm lawyers must 
also understand their lawyer-managers’ expectations.  
Understanding what those above you want is crucial for promotion 
to non-equity and to equity partner.  Understanding what firm 
management and peers expect is also a key ingredient for success 
in the battle for resources among equity partners and practice 
groups.  
When they speak about expectations, large-firm lawyers are 
talking about “norms.”210  Some of the norms lawyers must 
understand and follow are shared by lawyers across the firm; 
others are not. When individual partners or groups of lawyers 
within the firm do not espouse or follow the same norms, large-
firm lawyers employ a choice of norm rule.  Across all of the large 
firms I studied, the choice of norm rule lawyers applied was the 
same: understand and follow the expectations/norms that the 
lawyer or lawyers who matter at the moment would want you to 
follow in the situation. When I asked large-firm lawyers to 
describe what is expected of them and how they meet those 
expectations, first and foremost, they spoke about “being 
available” to the lawyers with and for whom they work.  
209. It is relatively rare for associates and junior partners in large firms to 
generate their own business because the firm is looking for work among Fortune 
500 companies and other wealthy clients who can pay them fees which ranged 
from $190 to $725 per hour at the time of my research.  See Renee Deger, 
Silicon Valley Sees Rates on the Rise, NAT’L. L.J., Dec. 15, 2003, at col. 1 
(reporting on recent hourly rate increases).  However, an associate or junior 
partner who does generate business will occupy the role of the finder.  
210. See Sunstein, supra note 154, at 914 (defining “norms” as “social 
attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and 
what ought not to be done”). 
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A.  The Importance of “Being Available”
In negotiating the case hierarchy, lawyers who work for other 
lawyers must understand that their supervisors are their primary 
“clients.”  Supervising lawyers expect “service” from associates in 
the same way clients expect service from their lawyers.  In fact, 
one lawyer referred to the lawyers she works for in her firm as 
“internal clients.”  All of the lawyers I interviewed spoke about the 
necessity of being available to other lawyers and to their clients.  
For lawyers who do not generate their own business, “being 
available” means not turning down assignments.  As a result, 
lawyers in the country’s largest firms work long hours when their 
groups have abundant work.  When asked how associates succeed, 
an equity partner said, “You have to be available.  You can’t say 
no.”  A successful fifth year associate noted:
I have never turned work down.  Actually, I turned 
down work once after a huge arbitration where I 
billed 1,000 hours in three months.  I needed a 
vacation or I was going to have a nervous 
breakdown.  I told the partner I would do the work 
when I got back.
A senior associate explains that expectations about being 
available often remain unstated:
Some associates don’t understand or don’t care 
what is expected.  I leave my Blackberry211 on 
vibrate at night.  One time I was working with [a 
partner in another department] on a matter.  At two 
a.m., I’m asleep in bed and my Blackberry goes off.  
It was this partner e-mailing me from the office.  I 
got up and e-mailed a response.  This went on for 
several nights.  James [the equity partner who is this 
associate’s mentor] never asks explicitly for this, 
but I know he wants it too.  He doesn’t say he 
211. “Blackberry” is the brand name of a hand held wireless device that 
allows the user to send and receive e-mail from outside the office. 
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expects it, but he wants me to return his e-mails 
over the weekend.  He tells me that he likes that I 
have never turned him down when he asks for 
something.
Even an astute summer associate quickly becomes aware that 
expectations about availability are often unstated, and if stated, that 
the stated expectations may, in fact, conflict with actual 
expectations.
The rhetoric coming from the firm to summer 
associates was that quality of life was very 
important.  We were told that if associates worked 
too many hours, the firm would lock the door to 
their offices and tell them that they could not come 
in.212  But when you looked at who was successful it 
was the people who were working long hours.
. . . . 
No partner at [the firm] would ever say “you need 
to work this weekend,” but the people who were 
succeeding were working weekends.  Whenever 
partners mentioned associates favorably, they 
mentioned those who were working incredibly long 
hours.  The people who were making it, the 
associates a partner would mention at a meeting—
“Jeff did a great job on this”—were the highest 
billers among the associates.  The “go to” associates 
never said no to an assignment.  These were the 
people who were first in, in the morning, and last 
out at night.
Superiors also expect the lawyers who work for them to be 
responsive to clients’ needs “24/7.”  Many of the lawyers I 
212. This summer associate noted, “Young lawyers coming into the firm 
were typically of two types.  First, there were those dead set on making partner 
from the outset.  Second, there were those who were looking for interesting 
work but also wanted a private life.  The summer associate recruiting 
committee’s message was geared to the second group of people.”  
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interviewed routinely gave their clients their home and cell phone 
numbers and carried a wireless hand held device for sending and 
receiving e-mails.213  It is not only associates who work long hours 
213. Not all associates working in large firms are willing to meet the 
expectation that they always be available.  During their tenure as associates at 
large firms, young lawyers are identified as what one lawyer characterized as 
“contenders” and “non-contenders.”  Some of the non-contenders are self-
selected while others are not.  As David Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati have 
observed, during the first several years of an associate’s tenure at a firm, large 
firms identify those associates who lack the required dedication or skills to 
advance and fire them or assign them low prestige, repetitive work.  See Wilkins 
& Gulati, supra note 82.  Among those associates who survive the weeding out 
process, many will decide they do not want to vie for partnership.  Many are not 
willing to sacrifice their personal lives to work the hours required to put them in 
contention for partnership.  These self-selected and unannounced non-
contenders may stay for a number of years to earn large salaries, but will leave 
the firm before they are considered for partnership.  As a fifth-year associate 
notes, they “do not announce their intention to leave because it would be 
political suicide to do so.” 
 The contenders I spoke with have similar views of the non-contenders.  A 
contender says, “One of the things that separate the contenders from the non-
contenders is their work ethic.  Many of the non-contenders are not trying.”  She 
observes that she and her fellow contenders are “in-bred workaholics.  
[Contenders] would be working this hard no matter what they were doing for a 
living.”  Another contender agrees: 
When I was in college and law school, I thought everyone 
wanted to make it to the top, to be successful.  I now realize 
there are people who just want to get to the middle; they are 
content to fly under the radar screen.  They do mid-level work 
and try not to attract attention.  They don’t want to make the 
extra effort.  You can tell who these people are early on.  You 
look to see who will take on a new project; who will take on 
the really messy project; who will write the article for the bar 
journal.  One associate says yes, the other says she’s too busy.  
Both have the same amount of work on their plate.  You can 
tell who really wants it and who is just comfortable. 
While they see themselves embodying a work ethic the non-contenders do not 
share, the contenders are conscious of the choices they are making.  Inevitably, 
they come to question their choice to stay in light of the low odds of making 
partner at many firms.  A fifth year contender at a large firm observes: 
I’ve missed a lot by choosing this large-firm life.  All my 
college friends are married and have children.  All my friends 
from law school [all of whom work at large firms] are single 
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in large law firms. One partner explained, “[T]he hours don’t get 
any better for partners; partners have even more pressure than 
associates do.”
The hours do not get better for partners because other lawyers 
also expect partners to be available to them.  Many litigators, 
including some partners, spend a portion of their time managing 
litigation for clients of partners in other practice areas.  For 
example, a corporate partner may ask a litigation partner to handle 
a lawsuit for a corporate client.  Because these litigators do not 
have the primary relationship with the client, and the corporate 
partner is providing the litigator with work, the litigator needs to 
meet the expectations of the corporate partner, as well as the client, 
to maintain this “feeder” relationship.  An equity partner related a 
conversation she had with one of her partners who was “fed up” 
with meeting his partners’ expectations:  
We walked out of the building one night, he told me 
he was going to stop working for this [group of 
lawyers in the firm] and go back to more 
generalized work in his area.  He said he was [fifty-
five] and couldn’t keep doing what he was doing.  
He said the partners [in the practice group he 
serviced] were jerks to him, often called him on 
Friday night at five and said “oh sorry, I forgot we 
need an opinion by Monday morning.”  He had no 
autonomy and no home life.  He realized that 
moving to more generalized work would mean a 
demotion in status and probably pay, [but] he 
wanted to make the move.  He [said] he could not 
do this for another ten years.
This partner was an equity partner with very specialized expertise, 
and he did almost all of his work for partners in other practice 
areas.
and have no kids.  Working till 9:00 p.m. every night is no 
fun.  When I occasionally leave at 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., I am 
amazed at the numbers of people on the street.  I think, “Do 
you leave this early every day?”  
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In contrast, a profitable equity partner who generates 
substantial business has far greater latitude to pick and choose 
when and to whom within the firm he sacrifices his time.  An 
equity partner, Will, described his response to Jeff, an equity 
partner whose book of business had evaporated in the last couple 
of years:
If he called me two years ago and said I need you in 
LA next week, I would have been in LA the 
following week.  Today if he calls and asks me to 
go to LA next week, I look at my calendar.  If I am 
not interested in going for my own reasons and I see 
my daughter has a soccer tournament next week, I 
will tell him “I am really sorry but my daughter has 
a tournament.”  Two years ago, I would have 
missed my daughter’s tournament.
Because Jeff was no longer particularly relevant to Will, the choice 
of norm rule requiring Will to meet the expectations of those who 
“matter” did not require Will to go out of his way to meet Jeff’s 
expectations.
Equity partners must also be available to their partners to 
garner firm resources when they need or want them.  One equity 
partner describes this as building a “goodwill bank” with his 
partners.  He drew on this goodwill bank when he wanted one of 
the lawyers who worked for him selected for equity partner, or if 
his practice declined and he needed his partners to give him time to 
rebuild it before they significantly reduced his compensation or de-
equitized him.  Asked how he builds goodwill, this partner said “it 
is really about not saying no.”
Increasingly, as the firm’s bureaucracy grows, lawyers in 
large firms must also be available to the lawyer-managers to do the 
“business” work of the firm.  Lawyers must be willing to do 
increasing amounts of non-billable work ranging from work on 
firm committees, or participating in client pitches, to helping 
prepare firm marketing materials.  Even partners are expected to 
devote time to the non-billable work of the firm, and unless they 
are so profitable that they have significant autonomy, they must 
meet those expectations.  Not all lawyers recognize the import of 
these expectations.  As a team leader explained:
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As a manager my “bullshit meter” is always way 
up.  The people I manage are litigators; they are 
advocates.  But some are all talk.  People can smell 
these folks a mile away.  These are the people who 
say, “Pick me, pick me” and never follow through.  
These are people who are assigned to do a client 
pitch; they volunteer to take on an action item in 
preparation for the pitch and never do it.  These 
people die and they don’t understand why, they 
think they are stars, well liked.  I say, “Don’t give 
me happy talk, do something.”
Some partners are sufficiently profitable to purchase a degree 
of autonomy within the firm, and as a result, may not have to meet 
all of management’s expectations.  For example, two profitable 
partners reported that they had not prepared the individual partner 
business plans their respective firms’ management required of all 
partners.  Neither partner was chastised for not preparing a 
business plan.214  While their practice group leaders apparently 
elected not to push this issue with these partners, both lawyers 
reported that less profitable partners in their groups were not ex-
cused from this obligation.
The expectations about what kinds of work a lawyer needs to 
be available to perform differ from firm to firm, from practice 
group to practice group, and often from partner to partner.  
Because expectations about what kind of work a lawyer should 
spend his time on vary, choice of norm rules come into play.  An 
equity partner noted, “A junior lawyer may think the partner wants 
him to bill 2,500 hours a year, [but] knowing what is expected also 
means understanding that in reality that partner would like to see 
that lawyer bill 2,200 hours and spend 300 hours chairing an ABA 
committee.”  A lawyer must recognize and understand these 
varying expectations and meet them.
Lawyers in large firms trade being available for a steady 
stream of work for support in their quest for advancement and for 
support in the inevitable competition for firm resources.  Partners 
214. One of these partners reported that he had been the most profitable 
lawyer in his firm the previous year. 
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who have relationships with powerful clients see a lawyer’s 
willingness to be available as a sign of loyalty, and they reward 
that loyalty with more work.  In addition, says one equity partner, 
“[p]artners . . . try to take care of people who have been loyal to 
them by helping them get elevated to partner.  They look for 
people who have been loyal to them and . . . who won’t compete 
with them.”
In contrast, a lawyer who is not seen as sufficiently available 
may lose a source of work and damage his chances of 
advancement.  An equity partner described the negative reaction of 
a partner she was working for when he thought she was misleading 
him about being available:215
If you are not responsive to [the partners you 
service] you are at risk.  If you are not there, 
partners and clients find someone else, and you are 
out.  [I’ll give you an example.] I disabled the 
function on my Blackberry that says “This message 
is courtesy of Comcast” at the bottom of every e-
mail you send [indicating that the e-mail was sent 
from a “Blackberry,” thus not from the lawyer in 
her office.]  One of the partners I was working for 
e-mailed me while I was at a meeting outside the 
office.  I got the message on my Blackberry and 
responded.  He sent back an e-mail asking “Are you 
in the office?”  I told him no.  When I got back to 
the office and saw this partner, he implied that I was 
being deceptive by turning off the Comcast 
message.
She explained that she disabled the Comcast message because 
“clients want to think you are always available to them.  If they 
know you are replying from out of the office, but you are not out 
[working] on something for them, they don’t like it.”  The partner 
seemed reassured, but this lawyer saw her partner’s reaction as 
215. This equity partner spends a portion of her time doing specialized 
litigation for clients of lawyers in other practice groups in her firm. 
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evidence that she must create the perception that she is always 
available if she does not want her partner to “find someone else.”
Having a strong relationship with the finders and binders a 
lawyer works for is also essential to surviving the occasional, 
inevitable mistake.  All of the lawyers I spoke with agreed that 
every lawyer makes mistakes.  Substantive mistakes range from 
missing a deadline, to producing documents that could have been 
withheld, to forgetting to shepardize cases.  Whether a mistake is 
fatal to a lawyer’s career depends, in part, on the strength of his 
relationship with the lawyer supervising him.
When a junior lawyer makes a mistake, the lawyers I 
interviewed agreed that the supervising partner rarely blames the 
mistake on the junior lawyer when communicating with the client.  
More often, the partner takes responsibility for the mistake.  For 
example, one lawyer says:
I’ve never heard of a partner hanging an associate 
out to dry.  Mistakes stay within the group working 
on the case.  You don’t tell other partners about 
them, you don’t tell the client if you don’t have to, 
that a mistake has been made.  If you can, you 
smooth it over.  The client doesn’t want to know 
that the associate has enough reign to make these 
kinds of mistakes.
And when an associate has a strong relationship with the 
supervising partner, mistakes may matter less.  As a fifth year 
associate notes:
I’ve made two mistakes.  First, I filed an affidavit 
without understanding what was involved in the 
case.  I made a mistake in another case.  I [sent] 
opposing counsel privileged documents in the 
discovery process . . . I disclosed a document to 
opposing counsel that had attorney handwriting on 
it so it could have been claimed as privileged.  
These are the kind of mistakes that make you 
physically ill. 
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This associate felt certain these mistakes would not be used against 
her because she had very strong relationships with the supervising 
partners involved.216
Associates must also show their loyalty by not revealing 
partners’ mistakes.  An equity partner explains, “I don’t want 
someone who is backstabbing me.  I had an associate who worked 
for me . . . who would then go work for another partner and tell 
him what I screwed up.  Why do I need that?”  If a junior lawyer 
has been sufficiently loyal to partners in the firm to develop strong 
relationships with them, those partners may also be willing to use 
their influence to advocate for his promotion to partner.
B.  The Criteria for Partnership—the Invisible and Moving Bar
When large-firm lawyers speak about their work, the quest for 
partnership—who makes it and who does not and why—is a 
central concern.  Associates are preoccupied with their own 
chances for making partner and measure their chances against their 
peers’ chances.  Partners are concerned about whether their 
protégés will make partner.  The habits of mind lawyers develop in 
response to the partnership tournament—the intense focus on 
managing perceptions and the premium on the ability to adapt—
play an important role in shaping their ethical consciousness.  
States one attorney, “[t]o make partner you must have a 
champion for your file.  If your mentor does not say anything 
negative, but does not give you momentum, you are dead.”  For an 
equity partner to be willing to champion a lawyer’s file, that 
lawyer must have demonstrated his loyalty to the partner by being 
available and by “knowing what is wanted and giving it.”  A 
partner who decides to champion his loyalist’s file will expend 
goodwill in the effort.  For example, one equity partner I 
interviewed reported that he had just received a call from David, 
another equity partner, asking him to support the election of Susan 
to equity partner.  The partner I spoke with believed David was 
216. See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 82, at 1613–15 (arguing that if 
firms were structured as classic rank order tournaments one would expect 
competition between associates or sabotage, but noting that large firms “do not 
appear to be characterized by high levels of employee sabotage”). 
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calling every equity partner in a firm of more than 700 lawyers, 
asking them to support Susan.  As large firms grow larger, the 
influence of each equity partner is diluted, meaning there are fewer 
partners who are profitable enough to demand that their loyalists 
be made equity partner.  
Most large firms have established committees to evaluate 
candidates for promotion to non-equity and equity partner.  These 
committees make recommendations to firm management and/or 
directly to the partnership.  Members of these committees come 
from different practice areas and often from different regions of the 
country.  As a result, the candidate may know few or none of the 
members of the committee who will evaluate him for partnership.  
The criteria these committees use to evaluate candidates are often 
vague or largely unstated and are constantly changing.  As a 
lawyer who has been working at a firm for fifteen years and has 
not made partner says, “The thinking at [the firm] has become that 
just being a good lawyer and doing a good job for seven to nine 
years is not enough.  What is enough is a matter of speculation.”  
Even a recently elected equity partner claims, “Having just been 
elevated to equity partner, I have no idea what the criteria are.”217
All of the lawyers I spoke with agreed that being a good 
lawyer is not enough to make equity partner in today’s large firms, 
and in a number of firms, it is also not enough to make non-equity 
partner.218  Large firms view good lawyers as expendable.  As one 
217. This is consistent with Wilkins and Gulati’s findings. Wilkins & 
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1667–69.  Wilkins and Gulati posit that firms use 
secrecy to keep senior associates motivated and working hard, stating:   
Recall that these lawyers are primarily motivated to work hard 
with little supervision by the desire to make partner.  Having 
no more than a minimal amount of information about how 
they rank against their competitors and what weights are going 
to be given to different aspects of their performance[], these 
lawyers have strong incentives to work hard at everything 
possible.  From the firm’s perspective . . . the black box 
approach—not the open door policy suggested by standard 
tournament theory—maximizes the incentive effects of the 
tournament for these lawyers. 
Id. 
 218. Accord PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 28 (contrasting this 
phenomenon with an era when good lawyers could expect to make equity 
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equity partner put it, “You can’t swing a dead cat in New York 
without hitting a good lawyer.”  By the time a lawyer is being 
considered for partner, “being a good lawyer is off the table,” 
meaning the “good lawyer” criterion has been met, and other 
criteria will be the deciding factors.  Now that fewer and fewer 
partners have the power to demand that their candidates be 
promoted to equity partner,  the enthusiastic support of one or 
more equity partners is frequently not enough.  When pressed to 
identify the other criteria that determine who makes partner, 
lawyers repeatedly spoke about the necessity of managing 
appearances and perceptions.
Perceptions have become increasingly important in large firms 
because, as large firms grow, lawyers within these firms have less 
direct, personal knowledge about other lawyers in their firms.  
Partners often know relatively little about many of their partners 
and they do not know many of the associates and laterals coming 
into their firms.  As Wilkins and Gulati note, even when an 
associate works for a partner, the partner often has little time to 
closely monitor the associate’s work.219 Wilkins and Gulati further 
state: “[i]n situations in which quality judgments depend on a 
complex evaluation of an employee’s technical competence, 
thoroughness, and judgment (in addition to results), a firm would 
have to retrace a good deal of the employee’s actual decision-
making process before it could reach an accurate assessment about 
performance.”220
Wilkins and Gulati argue that because close monitoring of 
associates’ work is prohibitively expensive, large firms have little 
information on which to base determinations about which 
associates will receive coveted training assignments.221  As a 
consequence, they argue firms tend to rely on readily observable 
signals (for instance law school status, class rank, prestigious 
partner in a large law firm). 
 219. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in 
Corporate Law Firms, An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 518 
(1996). 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 568–69. 
4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM
692 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 4
clerkships, etc.) to make these decisions.222 When decisions are 
being made without more accurate information, Wilkins and Gulati 
argue that stereotypes and bias are more likely to impact decision-
making.223 My research indicates that the lack of information in 
large law firms leads to another important phenomenon:  Large-
firm lawyers rely on perceptions to make judgments about one 
another.  As a consequence, large-firm lawyers must understand 
how they need to be perceived in order to compete successfully for 
promotion.
1.  Managing Perceptions
From their first days at the firm, associates learn to “look up 
and look around.”224  A fifth year associate assigned to the 
committee in charge of summer associates explained:
I give the summer associates advice when they 
come in.  I tell them “figure out who the superstars 
are, look at how they behave and copy them.”  I 
give them names of people who are superstars.  I
say, “Dress like them, watch their behavior at firm 
functions and with clients, copy them.”
Moreover, lawyers must understand that they may need to 
vary their public faces225 depending on the situation.  For example, 
a former summer associate described Jim, a “superstar” among 
associates at his firm:
It became clear that the good associates developed a 
partner face, when they talked to the partners they 
222. Id. 
223. Id.  
224. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 75–100.  “Looking up and looking around” 
is a phrase coined by Jackall to refer to the habit of mind of managers in large 
corporate bureaucracies who look up to their superiors and look around their 
social networks to determine what decisions to make.  Id. 
225. I use the term “public face” to mean the “conscious projection of a 
constructed persona” as Robert Jackall defined it in commenting on an earlier 
draft of this paper.  See supra note 6.  
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were different than when they talked to other 
people.  [For instance, when Jim] sat down and 
talked to [associates] it was like sitting in a high 
school locker room.  However, when he talked to a 
partner he was a completely different person and the 
switch was totally natural; he didn’t seem to have to 
think about it, he just moved into it naturally.  The 
associates loved this guy, he was succeeding but he 
was one of them.  The partners also loved this guy, 
it seemed like he was always at the firm, always 
available . . . . I was in [Jim’s] office at one point 
when a partner called him asking him to work on 
another project and he said to [the partner] “I’m 
really busy, can you tell me more about this project” 
and he would thereby create the impression that he 
was busy but that he would take on this project to 
work with this partner because he really liked 
working with him.  I don’t think that [Jim] was all 
that busy when he said this, however, this was 
totally natural to him, it wasn’t as if he was 
scheming. 
A fifth year associate contrasts the public face her firm 
expects her to adopt with adversaries, the public face clients expect 
her to adopt, and the perceptions she needs to create when dealing 
with her superiors in the firm.  She explains:
To make partner in litigation you need to be seen as 
really aggressive.  Your partners need to know that 
you are not going to be pushed around or bullied out 
there . . . . The client wants to know that you won’t 
be pushed around; that you will do what you need 
to, to defend them.  You have to create the 
impression that you are looking out for the client in 
every way.  Internally, [inside the firm] you need to 
be a yes person.
Not only must these lawyers be able to create contradictory 
perceptions—being aggressive and a “yes person”—at times they 
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must also project a public face that belies their reality.  For 
example, an associate tells the following story:
The partner said you run this case, Claire; “I will be 
hands off” but then he would call and say “how can 
you have done X?”  He knew nothing about the case 
but was calling the shots from the sidelines, from 
the bleachers really.  He was going to try the case, 
but he knew nothing about it.  I went to [my 
mentor] and asked him what I could do to get this 
partner involved.  He gave me some useful advice.  
But basically I had to run with the ball and give the 
impression that I could do that, that I could run the 
case.  The other partners in the department knew he 
wasn’t giving me any help.  If I had let on that I was 
panicking, it would have ruined my reputation with 
all of the other partners.
Perceptions are created early and can be hard to change.  A 
lawyer who has been passed over for partner several times notes:
One thing has become apparent.  It is difficult to 
come up for partner after seven to ten years at a 
firm.  If you’ve been there straight through, 
whatever mistakes you’ve made [and your early 
insecurities] are rattling around back there.  If you 
come in [to the firm] as a fifth year, you can start 
over; create a perception of yourself as a superstar. 
In addition to appearing confident, to be promoted, a lawyer in 
a large-firm must be perceived as “somebody who looks like 
they’d be able to develop clients.”  At the seven-to-nine year 
mark—when firms are deciding whether to promote associates to 
non-equity partner—most lawyers will not have generated 
significant business from the Fortune 500 companies that large law 
firms service today.  Consequently, firms make decisions about 
promotion to non-equity partner based on perceptions about who 
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will be able to generate that kind of business in the future.226  In 
some firms, the decision about promotion to equity partner is still 
largely based on perceptions about the ability to generate or bind 
substantial business.  In other firms, in order to be promoted to 
equity partner, lawyers must have a track record of either 
substantial business generation or significant expansion of business 
and be perceived as able to generate or bind more business.227
Perhaps most importantly, to be promoted, a lawyer must be 
perceived as understanding the need to create the right perceptions.  
Lawyers who do not understand what perceptions they need to 
create, or even recognize that they need to worry about how they 
are perceived, are not acting in accordance with their firm’s 
organizational logic—the socially constructed rules, premiums, 
and sanctions that lawyers create to guide their behavior.
A litigation department head gives examples of lawyers who, 
in his view, are able to create the necessary perceptions to be 
elected equity partner and those who are not.  He describes a 
226. This is consistent with Wilkins and Gulati’s findings.  See Wilkins & 
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1657–60 (observing “that [f]irms make partnership 
decisions not as a reward for past associate performance, but as a prediction of 
which partner candidates will contribute the most in the future.”  Promotion 
decisions are based on potential future performance because “[p]artners play a 
fundamentally different role in law firms than associates, even senior associates.  
[P]artners have obligations to bring in new business and maintain existing 
business that associates do not.”). 
227. It is also important for a candidate for partnership to create the 
perception that he has other opportunities if he is not made partner.  For 
instance, one lawyer I interviewed related a story about a colleague in his firm 
who was being considered for equity partner.  She was a binder for a very 
important client of the firm.  However, she and the partner who originated that 
business were the same age, and consequently, her strong relationship with the 
client did not increase the chances that the client would remain with the firm 
after the finder who originated the business retired because she would be retiring 
at the same time.  The partner evaluation committee recommended this lawyer 
for equity partner, but the management committee rejected the recommendation, 
a first to this lawyer’s knowledge.  Because this candidate had two children in 
college, there was speculation in the firm that the management committee felt 
certain they could refuse to elevate this lawyer to equity partner, and she would 
not leave the firm.  When I described this situation to an equity partner at 
another firm, he confirmed that “the first question that is asked is will [the 
lawyer] leave if we don’t make him a partner.” 
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meeting where four non-equity partners met with him and the 
managing partner of the firm to discuss a difficult issue:
I can look down the table and tell you who will 
make it and who won’t.  You know it when you see 
it, the type of person who will be “accretive.”  The 
first lawyer is the smartest person in the room.  She 
will only make equity partner if she has a very 
strong political rabbi.228  She will never be able to 
instill confidence in a client.  A client will never 
look at her and think “she will take care of me.”  
She will always need a translator who can 
communicate her advice to clients.  The next guy is 
not quite as smart and has the same problem.  The 
third guy at the table is another [dissent reader] but 
he has pretensions of worldliness.  When he talks, 
he leans into the conference table.  It’s as if 
someone told him that “players lean in” when they 
speak.  Who knows, maybe this guy will make it.  
Sometimes if you wear the shoes long enough they 
fit.  The last guy at the table is the complete natural.  
He is self possessed, entirely articulate, only speaks 
when he has something to say, not to hear himself 
talk.  When he talks, no one interrupts him and he 
adds something new.  I’d bet dollars to donuts this 
guy will be an equity partner within a few years. 
Thus, creating the right perceptions for promotion requires 
understanding what public face a partner is expected to adopt in a 
given situation.  A lawyer must be skilled in reading situations and 
understanding the public face called for at a given time and place 
in order to successfully navigate the road to advancement in a 
large-firm.  Although the non-equity partner with “pretensions of 
worldliness” is not able to wear the public face comfortably at this 
point, in the department head’s view, he has a greater chance of 
making equity partner than the first two lawyers because he, at 
228. “Rabbi” is the term the lawyer used.  It was not a term widely used 
among my interviewees.  
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least, understands the need to create a public face appropriate to 
the situation.  The “natural” not only understands this, he is able to 
do it seamlessly.229
The department head sees these same four lawyers’ 
approaches to an issue about a discrepancy in pay—their 
understanding or lack of understanding of the etiquette required in 
the situation—as indicative of their suitability for promotion.  One 
department head told me:
When I met with them individually before this 
meeting, [the first three lawyers at the table] whined 
about the disparity in pay.  The “natural” says to 
me, “I’m upset and you can write down that I am 
upset, but tell the guys at the top, I’ll take a $50,000 
pay cut if they will give me first chair in a trial for a 
Fortune 50 client.  I can make a career out of that.”  
This guy sees the macro.
. . .  
[He] is not a management problem—I don’t have to 
manage this guy.  The dissent readers are the 
problem.  I have to manage them . . . . You have to 
bring the world to these guys.  They don’t 
understand it themselves.”
For the department head, the question for promotion purposes 
was not whether any of these four lawyers was ready to try a case 
for a Fortune 50 client, but which of them knew it was appropriate 
in response to a pay discrepancy issue to project a public face of 
confidence and eagerness.  In this way, large-firm litigators 
routinely equate appearances with substance.  Their habit of mind 
is to attend to, and make crucial judgments on, the basis of 
perceptions.
229. Lawyers I interviewed had a variety of names for the “natural” 
including the “superstar” and the “complete athlete.”  The lawyers this subject 
referred to as “dissent readers,” lawyers who are bright but lack the ability to 
discern and meet expectations about the perceptions they need to create, were 
also referred to as the “guy who wore black socks to gym class.” 
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This department head, and other lawyers I interviewed who 
are skilled at reading expectations, expressed significant frustration 
with lawyers who do not recognize the need to create the right 
perceptions and/or are not able to read expectations about what 
public face is appropriate in a given situation.  Their failure to 
understand the logic of their firms makes them unqualified for 
promotion.  These lawyers are at best naïve, and at worst, 
“management problems” because they will not understand why 
they are not advancing and are likely to become dissatisfied with 
their stagnated careers.  But even those lawyers who can read 
expectations and manage their public faces accordingly face 
uncertainty because what is expected always changes.
2.  Paradigm Shifts and the Premium on the Ability to Change
Expectations often change as new lawyers take over positions 
of power within management or when the lawyers in power decide 
to change the strategic plan.  Changes in the strategic plan may 
prompt changes in the rhetoric used in the firm.  For instance, one 
lawyer noted that management at his firm stressed “total quality 
client service.”  This was the “buzz phrase” in his firm.  In a later 
interview with another lawyer in the same firm, it became apparent 
that, after hiring a consulting firm, firm management had decided 
to focus on branding certain practice groups, and that “branding” 
was the new buzz phrase.  Many firms employ consultants to assist 
them in formulating their strategic plans.230  These consultants sell 
230. A cottage industry of consultants specializing in advising large law 
firms has developed over the last several decades.  See C. Marcus Harris, Use of 
Consultants by Lawyers, in GARY A. MUNNEKE, LAW PRACTICE 
MANAGEMENT: MATERIALS AND CASES, 144–51 (1991) (documenting the 
growth of consultants providing advice to law firms on topics ranging from 
internal partnership relations, to compensation, to advertising and marketing); 
see also About Altman & Weil, at http://www.altmanweil.com/about.cfm (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2005) (documenting the formation of the firm in 1970, services 
offered, and its current status as the only consulting firm “specializing in legal 
organizations” listed in the Consultant’s News top 100 management consulting 
firms); Hildebrandt International, Legal Consulting Services, at 
http://www.hildebrandt.com/Consult- 
ingServices.aspx?BD_ID=4858 (last visited Jan. 11, 2005) (describing firm’s 25 
year history and services offered to law firms to improve internal structure, 
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advice about marketing and management strategies that they claim 
will make firms successful.  A former managing partner explains:
Consultants claim to have information no one else 
has and this is what they sell.  The firms are looking 
for the “Promised Land” and the consultants tell 
them they’ve been to the top of the mountain and 
seen what no one else has seen.  The firms could do 
all of this themselves, there is no magic to it. 
Armed with a consultant’s advice, management has
“credibility” when it makes a decision to promote one practice 
group over another, or to reward one activity more generously than 
another in the firm’s compensation formula.  A couple of years 
later, consultants will inevitably come back with new information 
and advice, changing the strategic plan and associated 
expectations.  In other words, as the strategic plan changes, 
management’s norms often change.
Shifts in the strategic plan can have enormous consequences 
for lawyers trying to advance in large firms.  A non-equity partner 
in his thirteenth year at his firm describes the “paradigm shifts” 
that have complicated his quest for equity partnership at his firm.  
He explains:
During my first four years at the firm, there were 
two categories of lawyers at the firm; the people 
who brought in the work and the people who did the 
work.  There was a paradigm shift [somewhere 
between] my five to ten year mark.  Then the idea 
du jour was “everyone needs to bring in business.”  
Everything was about marketing.  “Everyone needs 
to become a rainmaker.”  If you didn’t, you were 
looked on negatively or forced out.  I focused on 
rainmaking.  I’m a good schmoozer.  I brought in 
$400K as a [young] associate one year.  This was 
more than some of the litigation partners were 
bringing in.  [Firm management] would ask me to 
efficiency and profitability). 
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be on panels for seminars for associates about 
rainmaking.  I was [held up as an example,] well 
regarded.
In the last two to three years the idea du jour has 
been “driving work.”  Litigators are supposed to 
expand the business coming from existing clients 
(usually clients of other departments).  Now we are 
being told “don’t waste time rainmaking; litigators 
can’t generate business.”  Now you need to be the 
“go to guy” for a corporate guy who needs a 
litigator.  [Now I’m in a difficult position].  I 
haven’t worked on establishing relationships within 
the firm and I don’t want to be working for [a 
corporate partner].  I like autonomy.  Every time the 
paradigm shifts it sends me into a tailspin.
This lawyer attributed this latest paradigm shift to a change in 
firm management and a subsequent change in the strategic plan.  
The firm had recently merged with a smaller litigation boutique.  
The leading lawyer in the boutique firm had a large and very 
profitable client base and was made head of litigation as part of the 
merger agreement.  When he became department head, the 
expectations for litigators in the firm changed.
[The new head of litigation] says marketing is 
“bullshit.”  He sat me down and said, “What are you 
doing?”  He told me that in all his years of practice 
he has never marketed.  He made himself the “go to 
guy” for all the corporate people.  He says 
“litigators can’t generate business; they must be 
driving business.”  He told me he has buy in from 
senior people in the firm on this, so a litigator can 
qualify for equity partner by expanding business 
and compensation will also reflect the value of this 
activity.
Assuming a lawyer is able to keep up with his firm’s paradigm 
shifts, to be promoted, he also needs to be lucky.
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3.  Luck—the Trump Card
To be promoted in large law firms today, a lawyer must be in 
the right place at the right time.  The relative status of the lawyer’s 
practice group at the time he is being considered for non-equity 
and equity partner will be a deciding factor in promotion decisions.  
As a seventh year associate at a large national firm puts it, to make 
partner, “[Y]ou need to be a good lawyer, you need to know what 
[partners] want from you and give it to them, and you need to be in 
a hot practice group.”  A practice group is “hot” when it is busy, 
profitable, and has a place in the firm’s strategic plan.
The same associate noted that the hot practice group can 
change rapidly.  He identified Mergers and Acquisitions, Corporate 
Finance and Venture Capital as three practice groups that had been 
hot, but had suffered recent reversals of fortune because of changes 
in the financial markets that would make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for associates in those groups to make partner at the 
time of our interview.231  Changes in the firm’s strategic plan may 
also affect which practice group is hot in a firm at any given time.  
As a litigation department head explains:232
[We] have a high level insurance coverage litigation 
practice.  The firm doesn’t want to be known as an 
insurance coverage firm, however, that work tends 
to be countercyclical.  So it is good work to have.  
Some of the partners in the insurance coverage 
practice can be some of the higher paid people in 
the firm.  But the firm is not going to work at 
growing that practice group; we won’t be doing a 
lot of new hiring there; we won’t be making a lot of 
new capital partners in that area.  
231. Wilkins and Gulati note the pivotal role of external market forces in 
their reconception of the promotion to partner tournament and argue that 
associates bear the risk of market fluctuations in the tournament.  Wilkins & 
Gulati, supra note 82, at 1660–61. 
 232. My research indicates that the firm’s strategic plan also plays a 
pivotal role in who wins and loses the tournament.  Again, it is the associates 
who bear the risk that changes in the strategic plan may change the criteria for 
success in the tournament. 
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Consequently, an associate or non-equity partner who chose a 
specialty in his first several years at a firm can only hope that 
seven-to-nine years later, when he is being considered for non-
equity partner and when he is considered for equity partner 
thereafter, his practice group is busy, profitable, and has a 
prominent place in the firm’s strategic plan.
C.  Success in the Competition for Resources
Lawyers who are promoted to partner must continue to 
accurately read and meet colleagues’ and firm management’s 
expectations and manage perceptions.  For example, most firms 
recognize subjective criteria relating to partners contributions to 
the firm in their compensation decisions.  This subjective criterion 
is referred to by different names in each firm, for example, “good 
citizenship credit” or “glue” (as in holding the firm together.)  
Willingness to spend time on associate training, participate in 
client pitches, respond to requests for information from potential 
clients, prepare marketing materials, serve on firm committees, and 
work to generate new business are all viewed, to varying degrees, 
as contributions to the health of the firm.  Thus, some portion of an 
equity partner’s compensation will turn on the compensation 
committee’s perceptions about the partner’s contribution to the 
day-to-day administration of the firm. 
Further, an equity partner may want to grow his practice by 
hiring more paralegals or associates for his practice group.  He 
may want some of his most valuable senior associates promoted to 
partner, or he may want the firm to market his practice.  To 
accomplish any of these, he must understand what perceptions he 
needs to create to win management’s support in the competition for 
these resources and wage his battles accordingly.  It is also crucial 
that he understand the proper etiquette for waging these battles.
Ann, an equity partner and practice group leader with a 
successful and growing practice, describes the competition for 
resources between her and another practice group leader.  
Together, Ann and Rob built the litigation department in their 
office into a substantial practice.  Ann explained that both of their 
practices have strengths and weaknesses.  Ann’s practice is rate 
sensitive (meaning the clients do not pay top hourly rates) but 
gives the firm exposure to the heads of Fortune 500 companies.  
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Rob’s clients pay premium rates, but Ann says his Achilles heel is 
that his practice lacks “cachet” and does not give the firm exposure 
to high profile, potential clients.  Ann states:
[Rob] and I are in a battle right now about whose 
practice gets preeminence and resources.  The firm 
is now at the stage where we are trying to get the 
profits per partner number up.  So the equity partner 
pie needs to stay small to attract talent, [meaning] 
premium practices from other firms.  [This means 
the firm will only make a few new capital partners].
[We are competing for resources,] but we [present 
ourselves] as arm-in-arm, a team.  We would never 
say anything outright to each other, or others, but 
the battle is going on.  I’m in one corner with my 
troops and Rob is in the other with his troops.  
Neither of us would say what I just said to you to 
anyone at the firm, but both of us are trying to sell 
our practices internally.
Another lawyer talks about the etiquette required in the 
competition for resources in his firm. “The whole system is self-
interest driven, but no one talks about it this way.  Everyone talks 
about it as an altruistic system or talks about it in a communal 
sense.  But so much of what partners are doing is being done to 
promote their own value.”
In addition to employing the proper etiquette in the 
competition for resources, lawyers must create the right 
perceptions about their contributions and abilities.  An equity 
partner explains:
You have to keep track of your client pitches to 
make sure that everyone knows that you’ve done 
them . . . . Some of this will be done subtly and 
some not so subtly.  People are trying to make sure 
they stay noticed.  There will be five people on a 
pitch. When they get back to the office only one 
person may talk about having gone on the pitch.  
But that person talks . . . so people associate him 
with going out and generating and finding new 
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business.  The person who is talking may not be the 
person who did the most work on the pitch, or had 
the client connection, . . . but it’s all about the 
perception.  Eventually, the perceptions may get 
clarified, however, the partner who talked a lot 
about involvement in the pitch has already created a 
perception that [he’s] generating a lot of business.
E-mail is a vehicle for creating perceptions in many firms.  
One lawyer says:
These broadcast e-mails are essentially 
advertisements.  A partner, or even an associate, 
will send out a broadcast e-mail saying, “I’m going 
to be making a pitch to client X.  If anyone has any 
contacts at client X, please contact me 
immediately.”  [Or an] e-mail will go out saying 
“we have a client doing X, if you have expertise in 
this area, please contact me.” [Or] “I was just 
appointed to X firm committee, and in doing my 
work for the committee, it would be helpful if you 
have any information on X, if you would forward it 
to me.”  These [e-mails] are really just a way to stay 
noticed, to make people think you have a big book 
of business or clout with management.
In many firms, an equity partner must also create the 
perception that he has the support of the lawyers working under 
him.  For example, David relayed the following story about his 
competition with Bill for resources.  Tension about compensation 
of non-equity partners developed when both David and Bill hired 
lateral non-equity partners at a higher rate of compensation than 
the home grown non-equity partners received.  David and Bill 
structured their respective lateral hires’ compensation in different 
ways.  The homegrown non-equity partners were angry about both 
compensation packages.  David explained:
This became a huge battleground for us.  We were 
vying for the role of the good guy who is looking 
out for you.  It was like politics—campaigning for 
the troops’ allegiance.  [Both of us were saying to 
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the non-equity partners,] “I’m looking out for you, 
this is good for you.”  To be credible in the 
institution you need a groundswell of support from 
the non-capital partners behind you.  We were both 
going from office to office campaigning one-on-one 
with the non-capital partners.
Equity partners create these perceptions to encourage the 
loyalty of good non-equity partners and associates who seek to 
form alliances with partners they believe have the influence needed 
to help them achieve partner status.  One equity partner stated:
There is a lot of, I don’t want to say deception, but 
illusion in this process.  Partners try to convince 
younger lawyers they have clout.  Some do it to 
make themselves look more powerful; for instance, 
“because of me, you were put on this committee.”  
It is also important to have more people working in 
your practice area, this makes your practice group 
look busy and important . . . . These illusions are 
used to corral resources.  Partners are trying to 
make themselves look important . . . . 
It is also crucial for a practice group to create the right 
perceptions in order to win the competition among practice groups 
for resources.  For instance, it is important that practice groups 
appear busy.  An equity partner explains:
The Practice Group leader has an interest in getting 
everyone in the group working.  Data is [tracked] on 
the average hours worked in each group every 
month.  If an associate does not get his or her time 
in, it makes it look like the group is not working 
hard because the average goes down.  This may be 
misinformation if the group is really working hard 
and it puts the group in a bad position.  Associates 
often don’t understand this. 
A former managing partner agrees, “[N]ot being busy is death 
in a law firm.  And it is a perception that is hard to change.”  This 
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premium on perceptions is a central feature of the organizational 
logic of large firms.
VII.  DECISION-MAKING IN LARGE LAW FIRMS
Lawyers make decisions against the backdrop of the 
organizational logic of their firms.  They make both legal and 
ethical judgments.  Many of these judgments fall within “gray 
areas” where there are no hard and fast rules to guide decision-
making.  For example, lawyers make judgments about whether to 
employ a targeted or a “kitchen sink” approach to litigation.  A 
“kitchen sink” approach is one in which they would pursue every 
advantage, including making every non-frivolous argument or 
objection available to them.  Lawyers also make decisions about 
how aggressive to be with opposing counsel.
Lawyers at the top of the case hierarchy often delegate 
decision-making to the lawyers working under them.  Because 
finders and binders are under pressure to expand existing work, 
bring in new work, and be available to their clients and colleagues, 
there are tremendous pressures on their time.  In addition clients 
pressure firms to keep fees low.  Consequently, the incentives for 
finders and binders to delegate work to “cheaper” lawyers are 
substantial.  When they delegate work, finders and binders look for 
lawyers who can manage some of their cases, meaning lawyers 
who will take work off their desks and make decisions without 
needing constant handholding.233  An equity partner expressed his 
frustration with lawyers who are unable to do this:  “You can see it 
233. Senior lawyers’ motivation for delegating work in large law firms 
appears to be quite different from senior corporate managers’ motives when they 
delegate work.  See JACKALL, supra note 6, at 78, 80 (reporting that in corporate 
bureaucracies decision-making was pushed down the ladder so that those on top 
could deny involvement if the decision did not “pan out”).  The lawyers I 
interviewed agreed that when a junior lawyer makes a decision that turns out to 
have been wrong in hindsight, the client will hold the senior lawyer, the lawyer 
with the client relationship, responsible for the decision.  Thus, delegating and 
discouraging questions appears to be a result of 1) a desire not to do the least 
desirable work, 2) the tremendous pressure on the finders’ and binders’ time, 
and 3) pressure from clients to delegate work to the most cost effective lawyers 
in the firm. 
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when an associate doesn’t have it.  They ask questions constantly, 
they don’t want to make decisions, they don’t move the ball 
forward; they have no clear sense of how to move the ball 
forward.”
Although the lawyers at the top of the case hierarchy want the 
lawyers to whom they delegate work to make decisions, a lawyer 
working for another lawyer does not have autonomy when making 
decisions.  An equity partner described how her decision-making 
changes when she is not the top lawyer in the case hierarchy.  She 
describes her work as falling into three categories: “mine, ours, and 
service work.”  The work she describes as “mine” is work she does 
for clients she brought into the firm.  The work she describes as 
“ours” is work she does as the “binder” for Jeff, her powerful 
mentor’s large clients.  “Service” work is work she does for 
lawyers in other areas of the firm.  She explains:
I make all of the decisions on the cases that are 
“mine.”  I sometimes handle the “ours” cases on my 
own . . . . I have worked with [Jeff] for so long that 
I know how he will answer most questions and so I 
don’t ask much.  When I don’t know the partner or 
the client as well, I am more careful about making 
decisions and will ask what the partner wants to do.
Lawyers working for other lawyers must know how their 
supervisor would handle a situation and must handle it the same 
way because supervisors are not looking for lawyers who will 
make any decision; they are looking for the lawyers who will make 
the right decisions.234  They must make the right decisions without 
asking too many questions and without making mistakes that will 
234. In some cases the supervising lawyer is the finder who originated the 
business and the binder is working to make the right decisions.  At other times, 
the supervising lawyer is a binder who grew the litigation business coming from 
a client.  In these circumstances, relevant binders may look for minders to 
manage cases for them and those minders must make what the binder believes 
are the right decisions.  Thus, both minders, and in some circumstances, binders 
must work to meet their supervisors’ expectations. 
4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM
708 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 4
make the supervising lawyer look bad to the client or to the firm.235
As a successful equity partner observes:
The minders are the folks who are being squeezed.  
For litigators the most difficult position is being in 
the middle between the senior partner and the 
associate.  The associate just does what he or she is 
told. The minder is supposed to take part of the load 
off the senior person.  This means making some 
calls.  [They] need to try to figure out what the 
senior partner would do and hope [they] were right.
What constitutes the right decision or the appropriate 
judgment on a question will vary depending for whom the lawyer 
is working.  A minder must discern how the particular partner he is 
working for would want something done.  Astute junior lawyers 
learn that they need to understand and conform to individual 
partner’s judgments on everything from style to legal strategy.  
One junior lawyer stated:  
The summer associates were assigned work with a
primary and secondary lawyer.  The primary lawyer 
was a partner; the secondary lawyer was a more 
senior associate.  The better associates would tell 
you this partner wants X, Y, and Z.  For instance, 
235. Wilkins and Gulati’s work with tournament theory predicts this 
phenomenon.  See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 98, at 538–39.  They state:  
First, partners will have a preference for associates who need 
little or no training.  Monitoring the work of other lawyers is 
both difficult and expensive. Partners want to staff their 
projects with associates who will be able to do the work with 
relatively little supervision. Finding lawyers who can perform 
work competently and quickly is the preeminent selection 
criterion.   
Id.  Wilkins and Gulati report anecdotal evidence that suggests “black lawyers 
may develop risk-averse strategies performing their work,” such as “ask[ing] 
more clarifying questions when receiving assignments” and speaking less at 
meetings with clients.  Id. at 576–77.  My research confirms that lawyers who 
develop these kinds of risk-averse strategies are less likely to create the 
perceptions they need to create to advance within the firm. 
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there was a standard interoffice memo form, but 
you always had to check with the associate to make 
sure that this partner wasn’t looking for something 
different.  Or the associate might tell you that 
although the partner said he wanted something back 
from the summer associate in two weeks, he really 
wants an answer in two days.
Lawyers must also conform to clients’ preferences regarding 
the work they do.  This junior lawyer further stated:
Each [in-house lawyer at the company] has a 
different style.  You have to know what each one 
wants.  One may want all memos in bullet point 
form and a plain English version of the issues.  
Another wants a traditional legal research memo 
with extensive citations.  I give them each what they 
want.  Some associates refuse to adapt to the 
client’s style. They say “this is who I am and I’m 
not changing.”236
Making the right decisions includes conforming to the 
partner’s expectations (norms) about everything from a lawyer’s 
stance in interactions with adversaries to the legal arguments and 
strategies he pursues.  For example, a third year law student who 
worked as a summer associate at a large firm notes, “I watched 
associates take more aggressive stances with opponents [on certain 
cases] because they knew that’s what the partner on the case would 
do.”  Another lawyer reported moving for summary judgment on 
more issues than he would have otherwise so that he would not 
appear weak to his supervisor.
When asked whether it is important that an associate be able 
to adapt to clients’ preferences, an equity partner acknowledged it 
is important.  However, he said he also wants an associate to 
exercise “independent judgment.”  When asked how he knows 
236. This associate noted that the associates who refused to adapt left the 
firm.  He was not sure whether they left of their own accord or if they were 
asked to leave. 
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whether an associate is exercising independent judgment, he said, 
“I ask them what they think we should do.  I’ll ask, ‘How do you 
think we should respond to this complaint?  Should we file a 
motion to dismiss?  What arguments would you make?’”  Earlier 
in the interview, this partner discussed associates who did not 
make partner in his firm.  He identified poor substantive or 
professional judgment as determining factors in the decision not to 
make these associates partners.  When asked to describe an 
associate who did not make partner, he said:
It is the kind of person who chooses a less 
persuasive argument then they might have on a 
legal issue; that would be an example of poor 
substantive judgment.  An example of poor 
professional judgment is doing something other 
than what the partner asked for. [I can think of an 
associate whom we did not elect partner because he 
had poor professional judgment.]  The partner had 
said something needed to be done by a certain 
deadline.  The associate did something different by 
the deadline and never discussed the change in 
strategy with the partner.
Thus, when a lawyer’s judgment varies from the supervising 
partner’s judgment, he must obtain the supervisor’s approval to 
exercise his judgment.  When a junior lawyer prepares a draft for a 
supervisor’s review or is expected to ask questions, many 
supervisors want him to come back with his own, better ideas.  An 
equity partner said:
I look for an associate who “comes to play;” an 
associate who will take a proprietary interest in the 
case.  A weak associate will give me a draft of a 
brief that is “half assed” and merely regurgitates my 
ideas.  I want someone who will come back with his 
own, better arguments.  I don’t want an associate 
who is high maintenance.
However, when the supervisor wants a minder to make a call 
without asking questions, it is essential for the minder to be able to 
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read the partner’s expectations accurately and “do what [the 
partner] would have done” without making mistakes.237
This means minders spend much of their time making 
judgments about what a partner would want in a given situation, as 
opposed to exercising their own judgment.  As a result, many 
large-firm associates are insecure about their skills.  An equity 
partner observed:
I can spot a large-firm associate in seconds at a 
dinner party because they feel like frauds—you can 
see it.  They are apologetic—they tell me what firm 
they work for before they tell me what they do.  
With a small firm lawyer, they are interested in their 
work and talk about the work; they do they’ll tell 
you—I have this employment case . . . . 
Although the sought after minders (those who know what 
judgments they are expected to make and make them) may not 
develop confidence in their own judgment, at the promotion stage, 
it is imperative that they appear confident.
VIII.  THE MORAL ETHOS OF LARGE-FIRM LITIGATORS
Across firms, successful large-firm lawyers follow a 
distinctive choice of norm rule.  As they climb case hierarchies and 
negotiate their firms’ management bureaucracies, they develop 
related habits of mind.238  They look to the lawyers they are 
working for and with, and those who matter to them at the time, as 
the source of norms.  As large firms have grown and become more 
bureaucratic under the leadership of their elite partners, the norms 
espoused by partners within those firms have become more varied.  
237. For some associates, particularly some junior associates at the very 
bottom of the case hierarchy, the need to give the lawyers above them what they 
want without making mistakes causes them to resort to cautious decision-
making.  “The task of the first through third year associates was impossible.  
You can’t make any mistakes.  Associates said to me ‘don’t be noticeable; if you 
have a choice between not being noticed and doing something outstanding 
which may potentially bomb, don’t take the risk.’” 
 238. See supra note 23. 
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Firms hire lateral partners who bring new norms to the firm.  
Large-firm lawyers must not only meet the expectations of the 
lawyers who supervise their work; they must also meet the 
expectations of the network of lawyer managers who “manage” 
them.  When firms merge or acquire new practice groups, power 
shifts and norms change.  Frequently, norms also change when the 
lawyers managing the firm adopt a new strategic plan.  
As a result, large-firm litigators are accustomed to “looking up 
and around”239 whenever they make decisions, and they become 
highly attuned to the personalities and preferences of the lawyers 
for whom they work.  When they survey the social landscapes of 
their firms, they see terrain shaped by individual personalities, 
styles and preferences.  Expectations or norms about what hours 
they work, what kinds of work they do, how they do their work, 
what decisions to make, what public face to wear and etiquette to 
follow in a given situation vary depending on who a lawyer is 
working for and who has power at the time.  
In this environment, it is not the norms espoused by the firms’ 
elite partners that will shape large-firm lawyers ethical 
consciousness.  It is the choice of norm rule that requires they 
identify and meet the expectations of those who matter that will 
shape their consciousness.  The choice of norm rule large-firm 
lawyers follow in their work life tends to make notions of right and 
wrong, proper and improper, mutable in the lawyers’ eyes. 
In addition, large-firm lawyers are accustomed to being 
judged and judging others by the perceptions they create.  This 
intense attention to perceptions leads large-firm lawyers to collapse 
the distinction between appearances and substance.  In important 
respects, appearance becomes substance in large firms.  Some 
large-firm lawyers are more attuned than others to the preferences 
of their supervisors and colleagues and to the perceptions they are 
expected to create.  This ability to understand and follow the rules 
of the fluid organizational game is of preeminent importance in 
large firms.  It is the lawyers who have most thoroughly adopted 
this habit of mind and are able to act on the logic of their firms 
who succeed in today’s large firms.  They are the superstars.
239. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 77.  
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A.  Ethics as a Function of the Large-Firm Litigator’s Habits of 
Mind
My research is designed to identify the organizational logic of 
large firms, the habits of mind and evaluative rules (e.g., the choice 
of norm rule) that guide large-firm lawyers in their work.  In 
contrast, the Ethics: Beyond the Rules project240 was designed to 
investigate “the prevalence and likely causes of, and possible 
remedies for, ethically inappropriate or problematic behavior in 
large-firm litigation practice, especially in the area of discovery.”241
The project’s scholars were particularly interested in “areas of 
problematic conduct ‘beyond the rules’ as well as in plain 
violations of ethical and practice rules.”242  Based on their empirical 
study of large-firm litigators in two large cities, each of the socio-
legal scholars involved in the project published an essay 
interpreting the data gathered from his or her own perspective and 
area of expertise.243
Several themes emerged in these essays that suggest that the 
organizational logic that guides large-firm lawyers in their quest 
for success and advancement within their firms, described in Part 
V, supra, also influences their ethical consciousness.  When asked 
to define ethical and unethical behavior, the Ethics: Beyond the 
Rules informants244 had difficulty doing so because what they 
considered ethical was highly dependent on situational factors.245
When the researchers pushed their informants to define ethical 
240. See supra text accompanying note 4.   
 241. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-firm Litigators: 
Preliminary Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 709 (1998). 
 242. Id. at 709–10. 
 243. Id.  
244. In Ethics: Beyond the Rules, Mark Suchman referred to the lawyers 
interviewed as “informants.”  See Suchman, supra note 10, at 843.  Where it is 
otherwise not clear, I refer to them as the “informants” to distinguish them from 
the lawyers I interviewed. 
 245. Douglas N. Frenkel et al., Bringing Legal Realism to the Study of 
Ethics and Professionalism, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 697, 705–06 (1998) (noting 
that “[a]ll of the papers, using slightly different labels, note the discussants’ 
avoidance or suspicion of any moral calculus in their daily choices.  Decision-
making was described as ‘situational’ or pragmatic, thinking ‘realistic’ and 
instrumental, standards as external, and ethical limits defined solely by rules”). 
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norms rather than rely on situational factors, the informants did 
two interesting things.  First, they tended to define right and wrong 
in terms of what others might think and, second, they elevated 
civility to an ethical norm.246  Finally, these litigators’ professional 
ideal was “a game well-played”247 meaning a game played by the 
established conventions.
1.  Ethical Decision-Making Characterized by Situational 
Judgment and Reference to Other People’s Morals
Mark Suchman observed, “[A]lmost always, the first assertion 
about the content of ‘Ethics: Beyond the Rules’ was ‘it depends’—
often followed by a very tentative and unsatisfying list of 
conditions upon which it depended.”248  All of the other scholars 
involved in the Ethics: Beyond the Rules project made similar 
observations.249  Robert Nelson described the phenomenon this 
way:
The biggest problem with getting the lawyers to talk 
about the gray areas in their own professional 
decision-making was the salience of situational 
factors to evaluating “proper practice.”  The answer 
to almost every question was that it “depends.”  
Aggressiveness generally is inappropriate, unless 
the war was initiated by the other side.  Hardball 
usually is inappropriate unless there is a specter of 
mischievous plaintiffs’ lawyers waiting to use the 
information from discovery for other suits.  The 
hallmark of good lawyering is managing the 
relationship with [the] clients so that no ethical lines 
need to be drawn in the sand.250
246. Suchman, supra note 10, at 847–48.  
247. Id. at 870–71. 
 248. Id. at 847. 
 249. Frenkel, supra note 245, at 705–06. 
 250. Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: 
Professional and Socio-Economic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, 
Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORD. L. REV. 773 
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Thus, a large-firm litigator’s definition of ethical conduct 
varies depending on the conduct of his adversary.  The situational 
factors the informants considered also included the client’s 
instructions, or in the absence of instructions, the relative strength 
of the client’s position, the client’s interests and desires,251 and the 
consequences of a chosen course of conduct, including the 
likelihood of being caught or damaging one’s reputation.252  Nelson 
labeled the apparent command that the informants consult 
situational factors, the “imperative of situational judgment.”253
The “imperative of situational judgment”254 is an extension of 
the organizational logic large-firm lawyers develop in response to 
the social structure of their firms.  The choice of norm rule at work 
in large firms makes right and wrong fluid concepts for the large-
firm litigator.  Fixed standards are anathema in a world where “the 
final arbiter of the quality of your work is not the client, the judge, 
or any external truth, it’s the partner you’re working for.”255
When pushed to move beyond situational factors to define a 
normative standard of right and wrong, several of the Ethics: 
Beyond the Rules scholars observed that large-firm litigators 
defined right and wrong in terms of what other audiences might 
think.  One noted:
Among large-firm litigators, associates [in contrast 
to partners] readily acknowledged the moral 
dimensions of their work, but often collapsed these 
into pragmatic concerns.  Thus, for example, they 
frequently discussed morality in terms of how an 
action would appear in a newspaper or to a judge or 
jury.  These imaginary external audiences seemed to 
(1998). See also Gordon, supra note 241, at 714–15; Suchman, supra note 10, 
at 847.  
 251. Gordon, supra note 241, at 714. 
 252. Suchman, supra note 10, at 847. 
 253. Nelson, supra note 250, at 780. 
254. Id. 
255. See supra note 1. 
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provide a “reality check,” or, in the words of one 
associate, an “objective moral standard.”256
Robert Gordon, another scholar involved in the project, made 
a similar observation:
According to our study, lawyers pondering a course 
of action will ask themselves, or each other, how a 
description of it would sound in front of a spectator, 
how it would sound to a judge, (often-mentioned) 
how it would look “in the newspaper,” “in the right 
hand column of The Wall Street Journal,” or to their 
“mother.” . . . Moral judgment, in other words, is 
something that others possess and may bring to 
bear; the lawyer’s task is to anticipate that
judgment.  He does not consult some internalized 
set of ethical or professional norms, such as what 
would be fair, honest, and just, in this situation, or 
what is the most consistent with the kind of person 
or lawyer I would like to be.  Rather, one asks, what 
would others think?257
Again, the Ethics: Beyond the Rules informants’ working 
ethics are entirely consistent with the habits of mind of looking up 
and looking around and equating appearance with substance that I 
observed in large-firm litigators.  Perceptions are the “substance” 
on which many important decisions are made in large firms.  As a 
result, day in and day out, large-firm litigators ask themselves:  
what would others think is the right perception to create in this 
situation.  What constitutes the right perception depends on who 
you are working for or who your audience will be.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that when the Ethics: Beyond the Rules
informants tried to identify ethical norms, they approached the task 
not by consulting internal standards or codified rules of conduct, 
but by reference to the expectations of relevant audiences, e.g., 
256. Suchman, supra note 10, at 844–45. 
 257. Gordon, supra note 237, at 732. 
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supervisors, clients, judges, and the media.258  For large-firm 
litigators, acting ethically was appearing ethical to a relevant 
hypothetical audience.259
2.  The Lawyer’s Role: Lawyer-as-Agent
The organizational logic of large firms is also a powerful 
influence on large-firm litigators’ conception of the adversarial 
norm and of their roles within that norm vis-à-vis their clients.  
The large-firm litigators’ habit of mind of looking up and looking 
around is superimposed on the norms created by the adversarial 
system, and, consequently, it shapes their understanding of those 
norms.  The reshaped norms, in turn, serve to rationalize the social 
structure of large law firms.
The Ethics: Beyond the Rules scholars made a number of 
interesting observations about the norms of the adversarial system 
and the related norms in the area of client relationships, as 
understood by their informants.  Nelson observed that “most 
litigators defined their moral obligations almost strictly in terms of 
the role they played in the adversarial process.  That is, they had a 
duty of zealous representation to their client but not a duty to step 
outside that role to attempt to achieve a more moral resolution of 
conflict.”260  However, as Gordon explained, the relationship of the 
adversarial norm to other competing norms has changed in recent 
years.  Gordon stated:
At one time (in theory, anyway; what happened in 
actual practice is obscure,) lawyers generally 
understood that this norm was constrained by, and 
had to be balanced against, other norms, namely 
those general duties owed by lawyers as “officers of 
the court” to the framework of substantive and 
procedural rules that structure the adversary system.  
But over the course of this century, especially in 
258. See Suchman, supra note 10, at 844–45; Gordon supra note 237, at 
732.  
 259. See id. 
260. Nelson, supra note 250, at 779. 
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recent years, those generally countervailing norms 
have been both weakened and reduced to rules.  
Instead of being confronted with two general 
obligations in permanent tension, which must 
constantly be balanced against one another, lawyers 
face only one dominant master norm: a client’s 
interest is to be zealously advanced, qualified only 
by particular positive rules.261
Thus, lawyers have elevated the duty to zealously represent 
their clients over other competing obligations, and the procedural 
and ethical rules that constrain lawyers’ conduct are just another 
set of rules to be gamed, interpreted, and argued in the effort to 
advance the client’s interests.262  Suchman concluded that the 
Ethics: Beyond the Rules informants viewed the duty of zealous 
advocacy as “an affirmative moral obligation, even when it came 
into conflict with other ethical rules.”263  For instance, many 
informants saw conferring with their witnesses during a rest break 
in a deposition as an affirmative moral obligation, even if the court 
rules in the jurisdiction prohibited such conversations.264  In the 
context of deposition defense, the affirmative moral obligation that 
the lawyer zealously defend his client meant that “walking the line 
[pushing the limits of the rules] was the preferred position for the 
morally responsible attorney.”265
At the same time that zealous representation of the client has 
become an affirmative moral obligation for the Ethics: Beyond the 
Rules litigators, their view of their roles and relationships with 
their clients has changed.  Although the notion of lawyer-as-
counselor has long been a professional ideal,266 when pushed to 
261. Gordon, supra note 241, at 728. 
 262. Id. at 737. 
 263. Suchman, supra note 10, at 854 (emphasis added).  
 264. Id. at 851.  
 265. Id. at 854 (emphasis added).  
 266. See, e.g., SOL M. LINOWITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED 
PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 228 (1994) 
(arguing that lawyers need to return to their traditional role as advisors to their 
clients); Bruce A. Green, Thoughts about Corporate Lawyers After Reading the 
Cigarette Papers: Has the “Wise Counselor” Given Way to the “Hired Gun”?,
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define norms in the area of client relations, Suchman noted that the 
large-firm litigators fell into two camps: those who saw themselves 
as agents of the client and those who saw themselves as 
fiduciaries.267  The litigators in the lawyer-as-agent camp saw 
themselves in “a passive position as an agent of the client’s will—
and pass[ed] moral responsibility along to the client-as-
principal.”268  The litigators who saw themselves as fiduciaries 
“asserted that they would make at least a cursory effort at moral 
suasion if they felt that their client was in the wrong.”269  Suchman 
notes that the lawyer-as-agent view was the dominant of the two 
among the large-firm litigators involved in the study.270  The 
informants felt they had an affirmative moral obligation to 
zealously represent their clients, and the majority of them saw 
themselves as agents of their clients, not counselors.  In other 
words, a majority of the Ethics: Beyond the Rules litigators 
believed they had an affirmative obligation to zealously represent 
their client’s will, without any obligation to attempt to constrain 
that will.
This comes as no great surprise.  In Partners with Power, 
Nelson argues that large law firms are controlled by those partners 
in the firm with the most lucrative clients.271  The dominant 
partners’ ability to retain power within the firm depends on their 
continued relationships with their clients.272  As a consequence, 
their incentives are not to act as autonomous counselors who serve 
as a check on their clients’ desires, but as agents of their clients.273
My empirical research suggests that the very structure of today’s
large-law firm bureaucracies mirrors this economic reality.  
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 407 (2001) (describing the traditional view of the 
lawyer as a counselor guided by principles of fairness and equity). 
 267. Suchman, supra note 10, at 849. 
 268. Id.  
269. Id. (noting that informants stated their best course of action would be 
to attempt to persuade their clients pragmatically, for example, by making 
reference to what other audiences may think).  
 270. Id. at 867.  
 271. PARTNERS WITH POWER, supra note 4, at 224–28, 288–89. 
 272. Id. at 276–89. 
 273. Id. 
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Large-firm litigators view zealous advocacy as an affirmative 
moral obligation and see themselves as agents of their clients 
because their habit of mind is to look up and look around.  The 
lawyer-as-agent norm and the norm that elevates the pursuit of the 
client’s interests to an affirmative moral obligation are consistent 
with lawyers’ daily experiences within their firms.  Junior lawyers 
are agents for the lawyers who supervise them.  Within their firms, 
most large-firm lawyers are not autonomous counselors who 
consult internal or fixed standards (i.e., personal moral beliefs or 
widely held professional norms) and advise their superiors about 
the appropriate course of action.  Large-firm litigators approach 
their relationships with, and obligations to, their clients the same 
way.  They must understand their client’s will and they have an 
affirmative moral obligation to zealously advance that will.  
Because there are few fixed standards of right and wrong within 
the firm, there are few obligations that might compete with the 
client’s goals.274
And while these habits of mind shape lawyers’ norms, these 
norms, in turn, serve to rationalize the social structure of large 
firms.  As one of the lawyers I interviewed observes: 
[Yes], a downstream lawyer may vary style 
depending on who he’s working for: When working 
for a take no prisoners’ partner, err on the side of 
being more aggressive.  For instance, you are filing 
a summary judgment motion.  You can move on 
eight issues; three you think are worthless, but you 
insert all eight because you don’t want to be 
perceived as weak.  But [I don’t see this as a 
problem;] even lawyers at the top of the food chain 
have to do this.  If they have a really aggressive 
client they adjust.
274. Mark Suchman notes that many of the in-house lawyers interviewed 
in the Ethics: Beyond the Rules project shared the view that outside lawyers 
were agents, not fiduciaries.  Suchman, supra note 10, at 849–50.  No doubt, this 
also contributes to large-firm lawyers’ increasing tendency to see themselves as 
agents, rather than fiduciaries. 
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Thus, the adversarial norm that promotes zealous 
representation of the client above all competing obligations and the 
lawyer-as-agent norm, rationalize the entire food chain in the 
large-firm and the “upward looking stances”275 it creates.  If the 
obligation to zealously represent a client is the overriding 
obligation and the litigator is an agent of that client, not a 
counselor, then it is appropriate that junior lawyers not define right 
and wrong for themselves, but instead look up the food chain and 
ask, “[w]hat would the lawyer I’m working for think is right here?”  
And the lawyer at the top of the food chain will ask what the client 
wants rather than consulting any internalized or fixed standards.  In 
this way, the adversarial norm and the lawyer-as-agent norm 
articulated by the Ethics:  Beyond the Rules litigators justify the 
social structure of the large law firm.276
3.  Ethics Defined as Civility—Appearances Equated with Content
Like their upward looking stances, the large-firm lawyers’ 
habit of mind that equates appearances with substance also 
influences lawyers’ ethical consciousness.  In my own fieldwork, I 
found that lawyers equated civility (i.e., following what they 
defined as the appropriate etiquette) with ethics.  For instance,
when I asked a mid-level associate whether the lawyers she 
opposed were ethical, she told me that she usually faced “the 
highest caliber lawyers” on the other side of her cases—lawyers 
who are “extremely ethical in their behavior.”  By way of example, 
she relayed a story about an arbitration in which she had been 
involved where the arbitrator had commended the lawyers 
involved on their professionalism.  I asked her how she knew the 
lawyers on the other side had produced all the responsive 
documents in discovery.  She explained:
275. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 5–6 (using the term “upward looking 
stances” to describe the habits of mind of corporate managers). 
 276. Robert Nelson notes that the imperative of situational judgment 
rationalizes the independence of the case hierarchies within large law firms. 
Nelson, supra note 250, at 781.  Because ethical judgments are governed by 
situational factors, it would be inappropriate for one partner to question another 
partner’s handling of his cases.  Id. 
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[T]here was not a problem with scheduling 
depositions, there was nothing said in the briefs that 
was stretching the facts or the law, I could tell from 
the way they were behaving in the deposition that 
they weren’t being obstructionists.  You can tell 
because at the end of the day somebody who has 
integrity knows that it’s not personal, they shake 
hands; these are professional lawyers.  I call . . . the 
other side and sa[y] “These are my witnesses, will 
you tell me yours?” And the other side . . . give[s] 
me their witnesses.  These lawyers are advocating 
strongly but it is done in a professional manner.  
You don’t have a full on battle if it is not needed.
This lawyer equates her opponents’ good manners and willingness 
to play by the customary rules with ethical behavior.
The Ethics:  Beyond the Rules scholars observed the same 
tendency for their informants to equate ethics with civility.277
When they pushed large-firm litigators to move beyond situational 
factors and define the normative standards that guide their ethical 
judgments, the norms many of them identified were standards of 
civility rather than standards of ultimate justice.278  Mark Suchman 
characterized his observations as follows:
[L]arge-firm litigators’ . . . comments centered 
predominantly on intra-professional279 obligations.  
Informants generally couched these discussions in 
the language of ethical pragmatism; however, by the 
second weekend, many attorneys began to introduce 
some (modest) normative considerations as well.  
Significantly, though, even when the conversations 
carried moralistic overtones, the groups showed 
little interest in (or concern about) morality with a 
capital “M.”  Rather, large-firm litigators tended to 
277. Suchman, supra note 10, at 846–47. 
 278. Id. 
279. Id. (using the term “intra-professional” to refer to other lawyers, 
particularly opposing counsel, but including colleagues within their firms). 
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frame the moral challenges of intra-professional 
relations as questions of “civility”—a normative 
standard, to be sure, but one suggesting that the 
primary consequence of violation would be 
pragmatic inconvenience and tit-for-tat retribution, 
not systemic corruption and depravity.280
Suchman also reported that the informants “repeatedly 
identified incivility as a central characteristic” 281 of those actors 
within the system, and their firms, who they identified as most 
responsible for unethical conduct.  When asked to identify 
proposals to elevate their firm’s professional practice, the 
informants’ comments frequently were directed at increasing 
civility.282  Suchman noted that “judging from the response that the 
issue elicited, one could justifiably conclude that incivility would 
rank at or near the top of our large-firm informants’ complaints 
about the current state of litigation practice.”283
Similarly, the Ethics:  Beyond the Rules litigators did not view 
evasive discovery responses as unethical unless the means used to 
evade responding violated the large-firm litigators’ rules of 
etiquette.  Suchman explained:
At the most basic level, one striking feature of our 
attorneys’ comments was the extent to which they 
analyzed ethical dilemmas as issues of intra-
professional miscommunication.  Repeatedly, 
discovery was framed as a semiotic ritual—an 
exchange of “significant gestures,” in Mead’s 
terminology—between two members of a single 
“discourse community.”  The measure of ethical 
conduct seemed to be “did the attorney send an 
280. Id. at 847.  
 281. Id. at 848 (identifying “incivility as a central characteristic of the 
profession’s purported villains (small firms, [and within large firms] lateral 
hires, mid-level partners, etc”)). 
 282. Id.  
283. Id. 
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honest signal,” not “did the attorney produce the 
relevant material.”284
When they frame ethics as questions of civility or sending 
honest signals, the informants are separating appearances and 
content, and, as within their firms, in the litigation context it is 
appearances that matter most.  It is not the substance of the 
response, i.e., whether it is accurate and complete, that makes it 
ethical, but whether the response is communicated in the 
customary manner.  For example, if the lawyer has decided to 
evade responding, does the response send the customary signal that 
the lawyer is being evasive?  Large-firm litigators are concerned 
with discerning and playing by the customary rules of the 
adversary game and they look for opponents to do the same.
In the same vein, Suchman observed: 
[T]he guiding ideal of legal professionalism [for the 
informants in Ethics:  Beyond the Rules] resides in 
the image of a ritualized adversary contest—a 
stylized confrontation in which lawyers serve as 
zealous champions for good and bad causes alike, 
without ever becoming so close to the principles 
that they lose sight of the nobility of a game well-
played.285
The stated professional ideal of the litigator informants 
differed markedly from those of the in-house counsel, plaintiffs’ 
counsel, and judge informants the Ethics:  Beyond the Rules
scholars interviewed.  The in-house counsel informants’ 
professional ideal was efficiency, “provid[ing] a cost-effective 
vehicle for his or her client’s specific interests, and [thereby] . . . 
facilitat[ing] the efficient functioning of the economy as a 
284. Id. at 866, 870–71 (noting that most of the Ethics: Beyond the Rules 
informants believed it was ethical to reframe a discovery request to narrow its 
scope and only supply documents responsive to the reframed request as long as 
the response indicates that the request has been narrowed, and thus, “‘tees up’ 
the issue for a motion to compel”). 
 285. Id. at 870–71. 
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whole.”286  For the plaintiffs’ lawyer informants, “neither the honor 
of the game nor the efficiency of the economy lie at the heart of the 
legal ideal.  Rather, the morality of the justice system rests 
squarely on its ability to provide justice.”287  The scholars make 
clear that plaintiffs’ lawyer informants were as pragmatic in their 
approach to ethical decision-making as were the large-firm 
lawyers, but they justified their tactics differently; they rationalized 
their use of harassing or uncivil tactics—their means—as 
necessary to achieve the “just” ends they claimed to advocate.288
Finally, the professional ideal of the judicial informants was 
finding truth.289 “[T]heir raison d’etre clearly resides in their ability 
to facilitate the revelation of fact and the debunking of fiction.”290
What distinguishes the “game well-played” ideology from the 
“justice,” “truth,” and “efficient dispute resolution” ideologies is 
that each of the latter incorporates a generally understood external 
standard by which the morality of the justice system can be 
measured.  So, for example, the plaintiff’s lawyer posits certain 
ends as moral, such as “gender equality,” and he acts in accordance 
with his professed professional ideal when he zealously represents 
a client in a gender discrimination claim seeking those ends.  The 
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ statement of their professional ideals, like those 
of judges and in-house counsel makes reference to a widely held 
value that the adversarial system purports to serve and that 
arguably makes it moral.
In contrast, the large-firm litigator’s professional ideal—a 
game well-played—does not incorporate any external standard that 
measures the morality of the system according to the values 
advanced through the real world consequences or outcomes of 
litigation.291  Instead, it incorporates a standard for evaluating the 
lawyer’s performance.  The standard it incorporates, “well-
played,” is defined by the large-firm litigators themselves, not by 
286. Id. at 871. 
 287. Id. 
288. Id. at 872. 
 289. Id. 
290. Id.  
291. Christopher Johnson discussed the idea expressed here and in the 
preceding paragraph with me at length and commented on it in an earlier draft.  I 
am indebted to him for his insights. 
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reference to any external, widely understood values.  In order to 
play the game well and nobly, a lawyer must understand and play 
by the rules-in-use, for example, by employing appropriate 
situational judgment and sending the customary signals when his 
or her responses are evasive.
Large-firm litigators equate ethics with etiquette and locate 
their ideal in the manner in which the game is played because the 
organizational logic of large-firm bureaucracies shapes their 
ethical consciousness.  In a world where others decide the goals, 
where right and wrong depend on whom one is working for at the 
time, and understanding the rules of etiquette and what perceptions 
one is expected to create is paramount, large-firm lawyers become 
accustomed to placing independent value on the ability to discern 
and follow the logic of the fluid organization game.  The value for 
them is not in the ends of the game but in their ability to 
understand and play by its rules.  Similarly, they locate ethics in 
the way in which they conduct the conversation rather than in its 
content.  The large-firm litigator’s professional ideal is divorced 
from the moral ends the adversarial system purports to serve; 
instead it centers on the skills that make these lawyers successful 
within their own firms.
If, as I have argued, the organizational logic of large-firm 
bureaucracies plays a role in shaping large-firm lawyers’ views of 
ethics, one would expect associates, who presumably have not 
thoroughly adopted the logic of their firms, to view questions of 
ethics somewhat differently than successful partners who are more 
thoroughly entrenched in that logic.  The Ethics:  Beyond the Rules
scholars found evidence of such variations in perceptions; 
associates saw ethical issues where partners did not.292  Associates 
“readily acknowledged the moral dimensions of their work, but 
often collapsed these into pragmatic concerns,” while partners 
“tended to deny the moral dimensions of their work entirely, and to 
reduce most issues to either ethical rules or pragmatic strategies.”293
When asked about what changes they might make in their firms to 
address ethically problematic conduct in litigation, “partners 
offered only the most minor adaptations,” while “the center of 
292. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 250, at 793–94. 
 293. Id. at 844–45. 
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[associate] opinion clearly favored more significant changes in the 
incentive structures of firms and in relationships with clients.”294
When the Ethics:  Beyond the Rules scholars read the partners’ 
responses to this question to the associates, the associates’ 
reactions were telling.  One stated:
I’m struck by the difference in perceptions.  We 
seem to identify more occasions that we thought 
ethical issues were arising in terms of behavior and 
specific issues [that firms might address.]  What I’m 
hearing from their responses is that there really is 
nothing wrong. [Another associate said] it strikes 
me that either we are wrong or they don’t see that 
[pressures toward incivility or abuse] exist . . . or 
they see it and they don’t care.  Or they don’t 
recognize it as a problem.295
I argue the latter—that the partners “don’t recognize it as a 
problem.”  Partners have adopted the habits of mind of the large-
firm lawyer; associates are works in progress.  Partners live by the 
organizational logic of their firms and that logic has changed their 
understandings of what it means to be ethical.  Partners do not see 
moral questions where associates do because partners do not 
measure their conduct against internal or fixed principles; their 
habit of mind is to glean expectations, to read situations, to 
collapse the distinction between appearance and substance, and to 
equate etiquette with ethics.  The structures and incentives of large 
firms encourage this; therefore, the partners do not see a problem 
to be fixed.
Several associates interviewed in the Ethics:  Beyond the 
Rules study identified mid-level partners as the primary source of 
“the pressure for borderline ethical behavior or hardball” in their 
firms.296  This also suggests that the organizational logic of large-
294. Id. at 793.  
 295. Id. 
296. Gordon, supra note 241, at 718 (noting that this assertion was 
disputed especially by the partners interviewed in the study); Suchman, supra 
note 10, at 872 (observing that large-firm lawyers identified lateral hires and 
mid-level partners as the “devils within,”—the individuals within their firms 
who were to blame for professional failings). 
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firm bureaucracies shapes large-firm lawyers’ understandings of 
ethics and lawyers’ roles.  Unlike senior partners, who began their 
careers before the thorough-going bureaucratization of large firms, 
mid-level partners have “grown up” in large-firm bureaucracies.  
They are also the lawyers who are being “squeezed,” who need to 
“try to figure out what the senior partner would do and hope they 
were right.”  Thus, they are the large-firm lawyers who are most 
likely to be thoroughly entrenched in the organizational logic of 
their firms.  For this reason, their conduct may be the best indicator 
of the effect of bureaucratization on lawyers’ working ethics.
IX.  CONCLUSION
The complicity of large-firm lawyers in recent, highly 
publicized corporate scandals has spurred a new chorus of 
concerns about large-firm lawyers’ ethics.  Mark Sargeant 
observes “there does seem to be something that links [the lawyers 
involved in these scandals]: an apparent indifference to the 
morality of their actions.”297  How did the large-firm bureaucracies 
where these lawyers worked shape their ethical consciousness?  
Sargeant argues:
Most of the lawyers involved presumably possessed 
some form of personal moral code, whether based 
on religious or secular premises, as well as a 
professional-role morality that should have been as 
stringent in its proper sphere as any personal 
morality.  At a minimum, those personal and 
professional moral codes would have insisted upon 
truth-telling, personal integrity, concern about the 
consequences of one’s actions for others, 
recognition of the limitations on one’s obligation to 
a client and an understanding that the “legal” is not 
coextensive with the “moral.”  Those moral 
priorities, however, seemed to disappear into a 
297. Mark A. Sargeant, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L. REV. 867 
nn.3–9 (2004) (describing in house and large-firm lawyer involvement in 
various corporate scandals). 
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smog of expediency, rationalization, willful 
blindness and slavish obedience to the wishes of 
self-interested managers who purported to speak for 
the corporate client.298
To draw certain conclusions about the role of large-firm 
bureaucracy in shaping these lawyers ethical consciousness, we 
need to study lawyers who have engaged in illegal or immoral acts 
on behalf of their clients or who refused to do so when asked.299
What we know now is this: the lawyers working in large law 
firm bureaucracies employ a characteristic choice of norm rule to 
guide them through the maze of norms through which they must 
navigate every day.  This choice of norm rule makes notions of 
right and wrong and proper and improper entirely mutable.  As a 
result, the large-firm lawyer’s habit of mind is to attempt to 
identify the norm appropriate to the context, rather than to judge its 
merits.  Moreover, this habit of mind is likely to make a thorough-
going organizational pragmatism the large-firm lawyer’s guiding 
moral principle.
The use of situational judgment, equating ethics with 
etiquette, and the elevation of the skills required for success within 
the organization to a professional ideal, are not problems unique to 
large law firm bureaucracies.  The organizational logic at work in 
large firms is similar to that of America’s large corporate 
bureaucracies.  In Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate 
Managers, Jackall describes the habits of mind managers develop 
in large corporate bureaucracies:
Bureaucratic work shapes peoples consciousness in 
decisive ways.  Among other things, it regularizes 
peoples’ experiences of time and indeed routinizes 
their lives by engaging them on a daily basis in 
rational, socially approved, purposive action; it 
brings them into daily proximity with subordination 
to authority, creating in the process upward looking 
298. Id. at 871–72. 
 299. The next phase of my empirical research will focus on precisely these 
questions. 
4/11/2005 10:48:25 PM
730 The University of Memphis Law Review Vol. 4
stances that have decisive social and psychological 
consequences; it places a premium on functionally 
rational, pragmatic habit of mind that seeks specific 
goals; and it creates subtle measures of prestige and 
an elaborate status hierarchy that, in addition to 
fostering an intense competition for status, also 
makes the rules, procedures, social contexts, and 
protocol of an organization paramount 
psychological and behavioral guides.300
Jackall concludes that in large corporations “morality becomes 
indistinguishable from the quest for one’s own survival and 
advantage.”301  This is precisely what appears to be happening in 
large law firms.  The large-firm litigator’s professional ideal has 
“become indistinguishable from the quest for [his] own survival 
and advantage.”302  This suggests that the organizational logic at 
work in large law firms is, in significant respects, a function of 
their bureaucratic structures.  It suggests bureaucratic work shapes 
lawyers’ ethical consciousness in distinctive ways.  This has 
implications for all lawyers working in bureaucratic settings.
John Feerick, former Dean of the Fordham University School 
of Law, recently defined integrity in the practice of law as 
“[s]taying with your principles . . . holding on to who you are and 
being yourself at all times as best you can . . . not giving up your 
principles in order to promote yourself.”303  According to the logic 
of the large law firm, however, acting with integrity, as John 
Feerick defines it, may be professional suicide.  Traditional notions 
of integrity and professionalism assume that professionalism is not 
merely a function of what makes a lawyer successful in his 
particular work environment.  Much of the scholarship that offers 
prescriptions to “fix” lawyers’ ethics assumes lawyers will check 
300. JACKALL, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
 301. Id. at 204.  
 302. Id. 
303. Mary C. Daly, Teaching Integrity in the Professional Responsibility 
Curriculum: A Modest Proposal for Change, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 261, 261 
(2003) (quoting telephone message from John D. Feerick, Professor of Law and 
former Dean of Fordham University School of Law (Feb. 3, 2003) (on file with 
Mary Daly)). 
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their conduct against an internal moral compass and thus have a 
sense when things are ethically “amiss.”304  Consulting an internal 
moral compass is foreign to the large-firm lawyers’ habit of mind.  
As a result, the increasing bureaucratization of legal workplaces 
poses significant challenges for the viability of traditional notions 
of professionalism and prescriptions for lawyers’ ethical 
shortcomings, or for any view of ethics and professionalism that 
requires a lawyer to consult some internal or fixed moral calculus, 
separate from the criteria for success in his workplace.  
304. See, e.g., WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, A THEORY OF 
LAWYER’S ETHICS (1998).  Simon advocates that “[l]awyers [sh]ould take those 
actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem 
likely to promote justice.” Id. at 138.  Simon proposes that lawyers use their 
judgment to weigh their obligations as advocates and as officers to the court and 
decide questions of justice.  Id. at 138–39.  My research suggests that the large-
firm lawyer’s habit of mind is to view norms as mutable.  As a result, large-firm 
lawyers are not in the habit of forming their own judgments about what 
constitutes justice.  See also, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A
New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 (2003) 
(advocating a rule requiring law firms to designate an in-house compliance 
specialist to address ethical issues) and Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. 
Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, General Counsel and Other 
Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 559 (2002) 
(describing the authors’ preliminary empirical study of large law firm 
compliance specialists).  As Chambliss and Wilkins note, one of the most 
serious challenges to the efficacy of in-house compliance specialists in large 
firms, is large-firm lawyers’ failure to recognize ethical issues when they are 
confronted with them. Id. at 587. Certainly my research suggests that lawyers 
who follow the large-firm choice of norm rule are unlikely to identify ethical 
issues when they arise because they tend to view norms as mutable.  The large-
firm lawyers’ habit of mind is to ask what norm a superior or relevant peer 
group would apply in the situation, not to ask if the norms are right or wrong or 
to check those norms against an internal moral compass. 
